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Abstract

Contributions to Fail-Stop Signature Schemes
In an electronic world, a person can electronically sign a document such that
the signature is verifiable by everyone. A problem m a y arise if an enemy w h o
sees the electronic transaction has unlimited computational power: he can break
the underlying computational assumption of the system and forge a signature. In
this situation, there is no way to distinguish whether the signer is trying to deny
his o w n signature, or someone else is trying to forge the signature. T o protect
against this problem, Fail-Stop Signature (FSS) schemes were introduced. A general
construction proposed for F S S uses bundling homomorphisms.

There has been two

constructions for F S S schemes based on this general construction which can be
proved to be secure.
The main objective of this thesis is to find n e w efficient constructions for FSS.
This includesfindingnew template constructions and also specific construction based
on the known templates. A second objective is to propose F S S constructions that
can cater for specific applications. In particular w e will propose constructions of
FSS that can be securely used in distributed environments, and F S S that can be
efficiently used for signing long messages. Both these applications are of high interest
in today's distributed computer systems and as will be shown, pose n e w security
and efficiency problems that require careful attention. W e prove security of all the
proposed constructions and compare their efficiencies with other known schemes.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

Digital signature schemes are the digital analogue of handwritten signatures. They
provide message authentication which is provable to third parties in case of dispute
[51]. A digital signature links a message to the signer's public key such that everyone
with access to the public key can verify the signature. However, only the signer (i.e.
the party w h o knows the secret key) can compute the signature. A s with any other
digital information, digital signatures can be copied arbitrarily. As a consequence,
the signatures of the same signer on different messages must be different and so a
digitalised version of a handwritten signature cannot be used.
Security of digital signature relies on a computational assumption. For example,
R S A (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) signature [114] depends on the factorisation assumption, that is, assuming that the enemy is not able tofindfactors of a sufficiently large
composite number in polynomial time. In a traditional digital signature scheme, if
a signature is forged, it will not be possible for the signer to convince the bearer of
the signed document, or a third party, that he did not sign the message.
To resolve this problem, Fail-Stop Signature (FSS) schemes were introduced
[140, 104, 98]. In an FSS, in the case of forgery, the presumed signer can provide
a proof that a forgery has happened. This is by showing that the underlying computational assumption of the system is broken. T h e system will be stopped at this
stage- hence the n a m e fail-stop. In this way, a polynomially bounded signer can be
protected against a forger with unlimited computational power. W e note that an
unbounded receiver can forge a signature but again a proof of forgery shows that the
computational assumption of the system is broken and the system will be stopped.
It can be shown that (Theorem 3.2 [98]) a secure F S S can be used to construct an
ordinary digital signature that is secure in the sense of Goldwasser-Micali-Rivest
[60] and so an F S S scheme provides a stronger notion of security.
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2

Aims and Objectives

Since its introduction, only two FSS schemes have been proposed: one that relies
on discrete logarithm assumption [137] and the other one that relies on factorisation
assumption [138]. T h e general construction of F S S is proposed by Pedersen and
Pfitzmann [98] to construct a one-time FSS. T h e construction uses a special kind of
hash function called bundling homomorphism.

T h e main aim of this thesis is to find

alternative methods of constructing efficient and provably secure F S S scheme. W e
will also consider F S S for distributed environments and also efficient construction
of F S S for signing long messages.
The aims are achieved as follows. First w e construct other variants of F S S based
on discrete logarithm and/or factorisation, which perform better than, or equal to,
the existing schemes. A n e w general construction of F S S will be proposed, which
enables construction of efficient F S S schemes for signing long messages. Finally,
application of F S S schemes in the distributed environment will be considered and a
secure construction will be proposed.

1.2 Structure of Thesis and its Contributions

The structure of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 1 introduces the topic, gives a sh
description of each Chapter and its main contribution, and provides a list of the
notations used throughout the thesis. Chapter 2 discusses message authentication
schemes and in particular digital signature schemes, and introduces some number
theoretic problems that are used in this thesis. T h e definition and an overview of
Fail-Stop Signature (FSS) schemes will also be provided in the same Chapter. In
particular, the general construction of F S S proposed in [98] will be described, and
the notions of optimality and efficiency for F S S will be introduced. The Chapter will
be concluded by describing the two existing constructions of F S S schemes, namely
F S S based on discrete logarithm problems (which is referred as vHP scheme in this
thesis) [137] and F S S based on factorisation [138].
In Chapter 3, a number of n e w F S S schemes will be proposed. A s noted in
Chapter 2, the underlying assumption of v H P scheme is discrete logarithm problem over the multiplicative group of afinitefield.However, as indicated by Miller
[93], the discrete logarithm problem in the multiplicative group of afinitefieldis
vulnerable against the index calculus method attack, unless the size of the prime
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field is reasonably large [85]. Therefore, it is desirable to find alternative groups to
improve efficiency. W e show a construction using additive group of points on an
elliptic curve. A s noted in [124, 8], there is no efficient way of finding logarithm
over elliptic curves, and in fact, the natural generalisation pi the index calculus to
the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem yields an algorithm that is less efficient
than a brute-force search algorithm. T h efirstscheme in this Chapter is a modified
version of v H P scheme for elliptic curves. T h e second scheme is a new F S S scheme
which relies on R S A algorithm [114]. However, as will be noted here and in Chapter 5, the new scheme is not efficient and has a security flaw. W e present an F S S
scheme which is based on factorisation and discrete logarithm modulo a composite
number that removes this flaw and is as efficient as the v H P scheme. Finally, we
give a construction based on factorisation and discrete logarithm problem that has
the highest efficiency, compared to the previously known schemes, with respect to
the message length.
In Chapter 4, a new general construction for F S S based on authentication codes
will be presented and an instance of this construction using linear authentication
codes will be given. T h e important property of this scheme is that for a fixed level
of security the length of the input can be varied and so it can be directly used to
sign long messages.
Chapter 5 will include a complete efficiency comparison of different F S S schemes
with respect to the length of the secret key, the public key and the signature, and
also with respect to the message length. W e will also compare efficiency of different
F S S for signing long messages and show that the F S S scheme based on linear Acode require m u c h less time for signing compared to the traditional hash-then-sign
method.
In Chapter 6, distributed F S S schemes will be considered. W e will first give (n, n)
F S S schemes, and then will present constructions of (t, n) threshold F S S schemes,
with and without the assistance of a trusted dealer.
Chapter 7 will, present an overview of our results and suggest future extensions
together with proposing open questions.

4

1.3. Notations

1.3

Notations

There are several commonly used notations in this research area. Table 1.1 contains
these c o m m o n notations. There are also notations and symbols that are specific to
this thesis and will be defined as needed.
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Notation

S

n
£
TA

k
a
T

\n\2

p\q
Zn
Z*n
J~p

N

II
H()

GuO
Ex
xeRY

Description
i
Polynomially Bounded Sender or Signer
Polynomially Bounded Receiver or Recipient
Unbounded E n e m y
Trusted Authority

Security level for the recipient in F S S schemes
Security level for the signer in F S S schemes
Bundling degree of homomorphism

The length of a number n in
its binary representation
p divides q
The ring of integers modulo a number n
T*he multiplicative group modulo n. The group contains
integers relatively prime to n
Galois Field of p elements
The set of natural numbers
String concatenation
A one-way hash function, that is H : {0,1}* ->• {0,1}5(5 « 128)
A keyed hash function, that is Qk : {0,1}* -> {0,1}S(S w 128)
Set of all x bit strings
A n element x chosen randomly from the set Y

This means that it must be
checked whether x is equal to y
Authentication Codes Notations:
Set of source states
s
Set of authenticators
T
Set of keys
E
Probability of success for the opponent in
Pdo
impersonation attack
Probability of success for the opponent in
Pdx
substitution attack
x = y

Table 1.1: Notations

Chapter 2
Preliminaries

This Chapter provides background for message authentication from both unconditional and computational security points of view. It also introduces number theoretic
assumptions that will be used throughout this thesis. In particular, it provides a
description of digital signature schemes, and discusses special signatures with emphasis on Fail-Stop Signature (FSS) schemes. A review of F S S schemes that includes
a general construction and a brief s u m m a r y of known constructions of F S S schemes
will be provided.
- W e introduce new efficiency measure for F S S schemes and show its importance
in signing long messages.
Part of this Chapter appeared in the Proceedings of The First International
Conference on Cryptology in India, Indocrypt 2000 [119] and The Computer Journal

[129].

2.1 Introduction
It is generally believed that privacy is the most important goal of cryptography.
However, in practice message authentication playes a more important role in securing
digital communication. Suppose a sender S wants to securely send a message to a
receiver TI via the Internet. S might be a person, a corporation or a network address.
TI requires to be sure that the recovered data has originated from the claimed sender
S. Message authentication provides TI with such confidence, and assures him that
S is the originator of the message.
Message authentication allows two communicating participants to verify whether
received messages are genuine. Message authentication allows the receiver of a
message to determine that [91]:
• T h e originator of the message is authentic (message/data origin).
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• The message content has not been altered.

Data-origin authentication implicitly provides data integrity, since if the message
tampered with during transmission, the sender S would no longer be the originator.
It ensures that the message received by 71 is the one sent by 5.
T h e Setting
It is important for a receiver of a message to be sure w h o sent the message. For
example, consider an online electronic banking system. A customer S sends a message to the bank asking $1,000 to be transferred from his account to B's account.
B might be malicious and change the s u m to $10,000. In this case, the bank should
be able to detect that the message has been modified.
Encryption does not provide data integrity. If one bit of an encrypted message
isflipped,assuming there is no redundancy in the message space, the decryption
results in a wrong or different message.
The authentication algorithm might be randomised, which means that it internallyflipscoins and use these coinflips to determine its output. In this case, there
m a y be m a n y correct tags associated with a single message m. The tag is used to
verify the authenticity of the message m.
T h e Adversary
The goal of a message authentication system is to detect attempts by the adversary
to modify the transmitted data. A successful forgery is:
1. when the adversary can produce a message that the receiver accepts as coming
from the legitimate sender S, or
2. when the adversary can substitute the original message from S with another
message such that the receiver accepts as original.
The adversary m a y try to recover the key. If he could do this, then he could
forge successfully. However, he might be able to forge without recovering the key.
There are two settings that can be used to construct message authentication:
1. Symmetric key setting;
2. Asymmetric key setting.
In a symmetric key setting, the sender and the receiver share the same secret key K,
which will be used to authenticate their transmission. In an asymmetric key setting,
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the key to authenticate a message is different from the key to verify the authenticated
message. Each sender has a pair of secret and public key and publishes his public
key which will be used by everyone to verify an authenticated message produced by
him. O n the other hand, only the sender, w h o holds the secret key associated with
the published public key, can generate an authenticated message.

2.2 Message Authentication with Symmetric Key
Setting
In this section, we assume that S and TZ share a secret key (Figure 2.1). To authenticate a message m using the key K, the legitimate sender uses a message
authentication function S that uses K and m as inputs, resulting in an authenticated message M', which will be transmitted to the receiver 7£. Let M denote the
message received by TI. TZ will apply a message-recovery function R that uses K
and M as inputs and yields one of two things:
• the original message m, or
• an indication that M is not authentic.

K
Sender

m or Reject

M

w

K
Adversary

Receiver

Figure 2.1: A Message-Authentication Scheme

In most cases, the authenticated message M' is just the original message m
together with a tag. In this case, the message-authentication scheme is called a
message authentication code or M A C [88] (Figure 2.2).
There are two general approaches in the design and analysis of M A C s :
1. Unconditional Security Approach;
2. Computational Security Approach.

2.2. Message Authentication with Symmetric Key Setting

M'

m
m

MAC

tag
tag'

MAC
.

K
Sender

9

*"
ACCEPT

or
REJECT

K
Adversary

Receiver

Figure 2.2: A Message-Authentication Code ( M A C )

In the unconditional security approach, security relies on the provably negligible
chance of an intruder to tamper with the message, without assuming any limit on
the computational resources of the enemy. This is also called information theoretic
approach. Unconditionally secure authentication codes have been introduced and
extensively studied by several authors including Simmons [125], Johansson [66] and
Gilbert et al. [56].
In the computational security approach, the security of a M A C depends on the
computational power of the enemy. For example, a scheme in which security is
based on a widely believed hard problem, such as discrete logarithm problem, can
be considered to be secure.
A computationally secure M A C m a y be obtained from a dedicated hash function such as M D 5 [113], and/or an encryption algorithms such as D E S [94]. A n
unconditionally secure M A C can be based on universal hash functions [31]. Such
M A C provide information theoretic security and so even if an enemy has unlimited
computational power, the security of the M A C will be guaranteed.

2.2.1 MAC in Unconditional Security Approach
In Simmons' model of message authentication code [125, 66], the security of the
system is unconditional which means that protection is against an enemy with unlimited resources. In the conventional model for unconditional authentication, there
are three participants: a transmitter, a receiver and an opponent. The transmitter wants to communicate some information to the receiver using a public channel
which is subject to active attack. That is, the opponent can either impersonate the
transmitter and insert a message into the channel, or replace a transmitted message
with another. T o protect against these threats, the transmitter and the receiver

2.2. Message Authentication with Symmetric Key Setting

share a secret key which is used in an authentication code.
The information that the transmitter wants to send is a source state, denoted by
s G M , where M is afiniteset of possible source states. The source state is mapped
onto an authenticated message rh G M , where M

is a set gf possible authenticated

messages (or often called messages [66]). Encoding rule is denoted by e G E , where
E is a set of possible encoding rules. T h e encoding rule is secretly shared between
the transmitter and the receiver.
A n A-Code is a triple ( M , M , E ) offinitesets, together with an encoding process
which is described by the mapping / where

/:MxE-)M, (s,e) ->• rh

For each e, the function / is infective and so when the receiver TZ receives a messag
rh, he can check whether a source state s such that f(s,e) = rh exists. If such an
s exists, the message rh is accepted as authentic (rh is called valid), otherwise, it is
not authentic and thus rejected.
A n A-code without secrecy, also called Cartesian A-code, is an A-code in which
an authenticated message rh uniquely determines a source state s. A systematic
Cartesian A-code is a Cartesian A-code where a message is the concatenation of a
source state with an authenticator. Such an A-code is a triple ( M , T , E ) of finite
sets together with a (authentication) mapping / : M

x E ->• T. Here M

is the

set of source states, E is the set of keys and T is the set of authenticators. W h e n
the transmitter wants to send the information s G M

using a key e G E , which is

secretly shared with the receiver, he transmits the message m = (s,t), where s G

M

and t = f(s,e) G T. W h e n the receiver receives a message m = (s,t), she checks
the authenticity by verifying t = f(s,e) using the secret key e G E . If the equality
holds, the message m is called valid (authentic). Formally, a systematic A-code is
defined as follows.
Definition 2.1 [66] A systematic A-code is a Cartesian A-code which the map
/ : M x E ^ M

can be written in the form
/ : M x E - > M x T ,

(s,e)->(s,t)

where s G M, t G T and e G E.
W e assume the opponent has the ability to insert messages into the channel
and/or modify existing messages sent over the channel. W h e n the opponent inserts

2.2. Message Authentication with Symmetric Key Setting
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a new message m' = (s', t') into the channel without observing any prior communication, this' is called an impersonation attack. W h e n the opponent sees a message
m = (s,t) and changes it to a message m! = (s',f) where s ^ s', this is called a
substitution attack. W e assume that there is a probability distribution on the source
states, which is known to all the participants. T h e transmitter and the receiver will
choose a probability distribution on E . T h e probability of success for the opponent using impersonation attack and substitution attack are denoted by Pd0 and
Pdx, respectively. Let P(-) and P(-\-) denote probability and conditional probability
distribution on the message space M x T. Then,
Pd0 = maxP((s,t) valid)
Pdx = max max P((s',t') valid I (s,t) observed ).
s,t s^s',t'

VV

'

IV''

If the keys and the source states are assumed to be uniformly distributed, then the
deception probabilities can be expressed as

Pd, = max^if^,
PH - max max \\eeE:t=f(s,e),t>=f{s>,e)}\

Since the opponent can choose between the two attacks, the overall deception probability of an A-code is defined as Pd = max{Pd0,Pdx}.

A n A-code is called e-

secure if Pd < e. O n e of the fundamental results in the theory of A-codes is the
square root bound [56], which states that Pd > l/^JEf and the equality holds only
if |M| < J\E\ + 1- T h e square root bound gives a direct relation between the key
size and the protection provided by the code.

2.2.2 Cryptographic Hash Functions
Hash functions werefirstintroduced in early 1950's [75]. A hash function maps a
set of messages into a smaller set of message digest (or hash values) hence producing
a fixed length checksum.
Let E

x

denote the set of all X bit strings, {0,1} X . A hash function U is a

function that m a p s a message m

D <M. That is,

G £

M

to a digest d G ED,

for some integer

A keyed hash function Q takes an additional input k eJ2K, from the set of all K
bit strings (key), to generate a checksum for a given message meY;M-

That is,

In the following definitions, the term hard means computationally infeasible
is assumed that the computation of the hash value for a given message is easy, and
the description of the function H is publicly known.
Definition 2.2 A function H : £

M

-> £

D

is a One Way Hash Function ( O W H F )

if,
1. Given d G £ D , it is hard tofindm G £ M such that Ti(m) - d.
2. Given m G £ M, it is hard tofindm' G £ M , m / m', such that
Ti(m) = H(m')

Definition 2.3 A function % : £M ->• £D is a Collision Resistant Hash Functio
(CRHF) if,
*

1. H is a O W H F .

2. It is hard tofindtwo distinct messages m, m! G £ M such thatJ-L(m) = %(m').

2.2.3 MAC in Computational Security Approach
Computational security measures the amount of computational effort required to
defeat the system by the best currently-known methods. M A C with computational
security can be constructed using a keyed hash function. Preneel defines a M A C
with computational security approach as follows [111]:
Definition 2.4 [111] A function Q : £ * x £ M ->• £ D is a MAC if without the
knowledge of the key k G Y,K, it is hard to determine Q(k,m) with probability
success significantly higher than ^D for any m G £ M , even when a large number of
pairs (mi,Q(k,mi)) are known (m ^ m^Vz).
The definition implies that a M A C should be both one way and collision resistant
for outsiders, that is the people who do not know the key. However, the definition
does not state whether a M A C should have these two properties for insiders. Berson
et al. gave an independent definition of keyed hash function which requires these
two properties [10].
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Definition 2.5 [10] A function Q : £

K
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x £ M -> £ D is a Secure One-Way Keyed

Hash Function ( S O W K H F ) if,
1. Given keJ2K, Q is a CRHF.
/

2. Without knowledge of k, it is hard to compute Q(k,m) for any m G £ M
when a large number of pairs (mi,Q(k,mi)) are known (m ^ 77^, Vz).

;

even

Similar to the cryptographic hash functions, it is assumed that the description
function Q is publicly known. The following proposition ensures that a S O W K H F
can be constructed from C R H F .
Proposition 2.1 [10] If there exists a CRHF, then there exists a SOWKHF.
Corollary 2.2 A MAC can be obtained from a SOWKHF.

2.3

Message Authentication with Asymmetric Set-

ting

Authentication schemes based on symmetric key setting do not distinguish betwe
parties sharing the key, and hence do not provide non-repudiation, that is either
party can originate a message using the shared key. If resolution of disputes is a
crucial requirement, then the asymmetric techniques m a y be used. One type of
asymmetric techniques is known as digital signatures.
The idea of digital signatures wasfirstproposed by Diffie and Hellman in their
seminal paper [51]. The fundamental idea [51] was to use a pair of keys, with one
key for signing, and the other key for testing the signature (Figure 2.3).
m

M'
ACCEPT

Sign

s'

Verify

..
Sk
Sender

or
REJECT

Pk
Adversary

Receiver

Figure 2.3: Components of Digital Signature Schemes
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Knowing the first key, one can find the second key easily. However, the inverse
is hard. Since the second key can only be used for testing, this key can be m a d e
public. Hence, there are two keys, namely the secret key Sk and the public key ptEveryone w h o wishes to sign messages generates such a key pair. A signer uses his
secret key to sign messages. Everyone can verify the signature and so verify whether
a message is authentic by using the signer's public key.
To be more precise, a digital signature scheme is a collection of triple algorithms:
a probabilistic algorithm gen, a probabilistic algorithm sign and a deterministic
algorithm ver. O n input of the system parameters, the algorithm gen generates a
secret key Sk and a corresponding public key pk of a signer <S. T h e algorithm sign
takes Sk and a message m as input, and outputs a signature s of rn. O n input of
a message m, a signature s and the public key pk of S, the algorithm ver outputs
true or false:
|| true if s = sign(m, Sk)
- ver(m,s,pk) = <
J false otherwise
Knowing s^, it is easy to compute pk- O n the other hand, knowing p^, it is hard to
find sjt without the ability to break the underlying hard problem of the system.
A signature scheme must be unforgeable, which means that it must be infeasible
to compute a valid signature for a message without knowing the corresponding secret
key. Infeasibility can be achieved by involving some cryptographic assumptions, by
assuming that some certain problems cannot be solved in polynomial time (hard
problem). Hence, the security of the signature scheme relies on the assumption that
the enemy cannot break the underlying hard problem, and therefore, it can only
be computational. A s noted in [51] there must be a lower bound on the signature
length and secret key length. If the adversary can try all strings of signature length
one by one, then he will be able to find a valid signature for the message. H e can
also try to find sender's secret key, by testing all possible keys. So the security
parameters must be chosen such that it is infeasible for the forger to carry out these
trivial forging algorithms.
Asymmetric secrecy schemes were introduced in [51]. In this case, a secret key is
needed to decrypt messages, whereas a public key is used only to encrypt messages.
Knowing only a public key, it is computationally infeasible to find the secret key
associated with it. However, knowing the secret key, it is easy to compute the public
key. Using this concept, each receiver should only have one public key, which can
be used by everyone w h o wishes to send a message to him/her.
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Attacks o n Digital Signatures
There are three main attacks on signature schemes which, in the order of increasing
strength, are [103]:
1. Key-only Attack: the adversary tries to deduce the secret key, or plaintext for
a signature, by only observing the public key.
2. Known-message Attack (passive attack): the adversary has a number of signed
messages and a public key, and he wants to deduce the secret key or plaintext
for a signature.
3. Chosen-message Attack (active attack): the adversary can choose a number of
messages that the signer will sign for him. H e has to construct the signature
on another message on his own.
4. Adaptive- chosen-message Attack [60]: the attacker can choose messages that
the signer's entity will sign after seeing the signatures on his previously chosen
messages.
Attacks on signature schemes are also often distinguished by the type of forgery
they achieve. There are three types of attacks [88]:
• Total Break: An adversary can compute the secret key of the signer, or can
efficiently compute a signature of any message by some other algorithms than
sign.
• Selective Forgery: An adversary can compute the signature of a message that
he could select independently of the public key.
• Existential Forgery: An adversary can compute the signature of at least one
message.

In the last two attacks, the adversary is allowed to involve the signer. The attack
is successful if the adversary can construct a signature of a message that the signer
did not sign.
Notions of "Provable Security" for Digital Signature S c h e m e s
Cryptographic scheme is called provably secure if the proof of its security can be
based on reasonable cryptographic assumptions.

More precisely, cryptographic
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scheme is provably secure if the difficulty of breaking it can be shown to be essentially the same as solving a well-known difficult problem. Hence, the word "provable"
means provable subject to assumptions.
The first signature scheme that is provably secure against existential forgery,
the strongest notion of security, assuming the existence of claw-free trap-door permutations, was proposed by Goldwasser, Micali and Rivest [60]. A claw-free trapdoor permutations family is a family of sets of permutations where.for a set S =
I/ 0 )/ 1 )" * ')/ r _ 1 } and x G domain(fl),

it is easy to compute fl(x) for all i =

0,- • • ,r — 1, but it is computationally infeasible to create a claw, that is finding
x and y such that for some i / j, fl(x) = fj(y) without the knowledge of the
trap-door [60]. It is conjectured by D a m g a r d [44] that collision free hash functions
can always be constructed if claw-free permutations exist. The term "claw-free"
originates from the pictorial representation showing two distinct domain elements
being mapped to the same range element under two distinct functions /* and p
(which collide at z = fl(x) = /J(y)) and thereby tracing out a claw.
A cryptographic assumption must be concise and must have been examined
thoroughly. There are several cryptographic assumptions that will be used in this
thesis, and they will be described as follows.
N u m b e r Theoretic A s s u m p t i o n s
As noted earlier, security of m a n y cryptosystems relies on the intractability of number theoretic problems. A problem is intractable if there is no algorithm that solves
the problem in polynomial time. If one could find an algorithm that solves the problem in polynomial time, then he would be able to break cryptographic algorithms
which are based on that assumption.
In the following, some number theoretic assumptions that will be used in this
thesis will be reviewed. More detailed descriptions can be found in [88, 40].
Discrete Logarithm A s s u m p t i o n
Definition 2.6 Let G be a finite cyclic group and g G G be a generator of G. The
discrete logarithm of some element a G G, denoted \ogg(a), is the unique integer x,
0 < x < \G\ — 1, such that a = gx.

The discrete logarithm logff(a) is also known as the index [81] of a with respect to
9-
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Definition 2.7 The Discrete Logarithm (DL) Problem is the following: Given a
finite cyclic group G, a generator g of G, and an element a, find the integer x,
0 < x < \G\ — 1, such that a — gx holds. DL Assumption states that it is hard to
find the above x = log.(a).
There are several algorithms that could be used to solve the DL problem [78, 79].
They can be distinguished by the type of representations of the group elements they
use and include:
• Generic algorithms that work in arbitrary groups. These include Pollard's rho
algorithm [109] and Baby-Step/Giant-Step algorithm [74],
• Algorithms which work in arbitrary groups but are especially efficient if the
group's order is smooth (has only small prime factors). A n example of this
type is the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm [106].
• Special algorithms that exploit the representation of the group elements and
thus only work in the group they were designed for. A n example of this type
i

is the index calculus algorithms for Z* [41].
When used in signature scheme, the size of the group in DL problem should be
chosen to be "reasonably large" [85]. Approximate value for "reasonably large" is
given in [85], where it is suggested that the size of "basic" prime for Z*p (which is
|p|2) is at least 1881 bits.
Subgroup Discrete Logarithm (SDL) systems are similar to the D L systems,
except that g generates a relatively small, but sufficiently large, subgroup of the
multiplicative group of afinitefieldof p elements Z* [120, 82]. The security of S D L
is based on the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms in this subgroup. The
logarithm can be computed if discrete logarithms in the full multiplicative group
can be computed. Hence, the security of an S D L system relies on the size of the
prime in D L system (which is known as "basic prime" [85]) and the prime in S D L
(which is known as "group prime" [85]).
To use an S D L system [85], the size of the subgroup must be chosen carefully.
According to [85], to guarantee the security of D L and S D L assumptions for the
next 20 years (that is until year 2020), the size of group primes in S D L problem
should be at least 151 bits and the basic primes in D L problem should be at least
1881 bits.
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A n example of cryptographic algorithms that use this assumption is the ElGamal
public key algorithm and signature scheme [52]. Recent techniques used to build
group signature schemes [37] also use this assumption by building a new cryptographic primitives called indirect proof [21, 28, 29, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27], Indirect proof
techniques are basically extensions of Schnorr's identification scheme [120, 121].
Factorisation A s s u m p t i o n
The integer factorisation problem is the problem that underlies the most well-known
public-key cryptosystem, that is R S A system [114].
Definition 2.8 The integer factorisation problem is the following: given a positive
integer n, find its prime factorisation, i.e. find pairwise distinct primes pi and
positive integers e^ such that n = p\lP22 • • •plk •
The algorithms for factoring an integer can be categorised into two different types:
• General purpose algorithms. The running time of these algorithms depend
only on JJie size of n. Examples are the quadratic sieve [110] and the general
numberfieldsieve [20].
• Special purpose algorithms. The running time of these algorithms depends
on a special property of n, for example, the size of the largest prime factor.
Examples of these algorithms are trial division, Pollard's rho algorithm [108],
Pollard's p—1

[107] and the elliptic curve algorithm [86].

Definition 2.9 Factorisation Assumptions [114, 128] state that given n = pq,
where p and q are prime with a suitable size, it is hard to find a non-trivial factor of n without the knowledge of (f>(n) = (p — l)(q — 1).
Approximate value for "suitable size" is given in [85] where it is suggested that the
size of n must be at least 1881 bits [85] to guarantee the security for up to 20 years
(that is year 2020).
Examples of cryptographic algorithms that use this assumption are R S A algorithm [114], Rabin cryptosystem [112], William's scheme [142], and L U C cryptosystem [126, 127].
T o construct the F S S scheme in section 3.4 Strong Factorisation assumption is
used. This is defined as follows:
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Definition 2.10 Strong Factorisation Assumption: Given n — pq (where p and q
are prime with suitable size), P - tn + 1 (t e Z and P is also prime) and a G Z*P
(where ordP(a) = p), it is hard to find a non-trivial factor of n.

This assumption is also used in the identification scheme of [19]. There is no proo
that knowledge of a of order p cannot reduce the hardness of factoring n.
Quadratic Residuosity A s s u m p t i o n
Definition 2.11 Let n be the product of two primes p and q. An element a G Zn
is a quadratic residue modulo n (or a square) if there exists an integer w such that
w = a (mod n)

If there exists no such w G Zn, a is called a quadratic non-residue. The set of all
quadratic residues and the set of all non-residues in Zn are denoted by QRn

and

QNRn, respectively.
If the factorisation problem is easy, then there exists an efficient algorithm to decide
whether an element of Zn is in QRn

[22]. For a modulus with unknown factorisa-

tion, this is believed to be as hard as factoring [22], but this has not been proved
(Quadratic Residuosity Assumption).
Definition 2.12 The Quadratic Residuosity Problem (QRP) is defined as follows:
Given integers n and a, 0 < a < n, decide whether there exists an integer w,
0 < w < n, such that
w2 = a

(mod n)

A n example of authentication system based on the factorisation problem and quadratic
residue problem is Ong, Schnorr and Shamir's scheme [95]. This assumption is also
used to implement a non-interactive zero knowledge protocol such as [14].
Digital Signatures Constructions
Thefirstdigital signature scheme is a one-time signature scheme due to Lamport
[83]. This scheme is not very practical. However, the basic idea is used to build
other types of signature schemes, including Fail-Stop Signature (FSS) Schemes. This
scheme is called a one-time signature scheme since each part of the secret key can
only be used once. The one-time signature schemes became more practical after the
introduction of tree authentication [89, 90]. Using tree authentication, the one-time
public keys are no longer published. These keys are used as the leaves of a binary
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tree (usually complete). T h e value of each inner node is computed by applying a
hash function to its two children. T h e value pk of the root is the new public key
which is published. Let p\ denote a one-time public key that is located in a leaf of
a binary tree. W h e n a public key p\ is used, it is authentiqated with respect to pk.
This can be achieved with overhead logarithmic in the size of the tree [89, 90].

pk1

t
sk1

2 3
Pk Pk

M'
sk2 sk3

4

P*?1

Pk

\
sk4

I.
sk

Figure 2.4: Tree Authentication

The first efficient realisation of Diffie-Hellman's idea was by Rivest, Shamir and
Adleman [114]. T h e idea is to use trap-door one-way permutations, that is permutations that are no longer one-way l if. one knows some secret "trap-door" information.
T o be more precise, a trap-door one-way function is a one-way function H : X -> Y
with the additional property that is given some extra information (called the trapdoor information), it becomes feasible to find an x G X for any given y G

Im(H)

such that H(x) = y. A trap-door one way permutation is a family of permutations
that consists of three algorithms: gen, / and f~l. A n algorithm gen can be used
to generate a pair (sk,pk) of secret and public key for the family of permutations.
Everyone w h o knows the public key ph can compute a permutation f(pk, •) from the
family, but only the owner of the secret key sk can compute the inverse.

RSA Algorithms
T h e signer S chooses the secret key which is two large primes p and q, and computes
its product n = pq. Next, he selects his encryption key e, e < n, where gcd(e, (j)(n)) =
iA function / from a set X to a set Y is called a one-way function if it is easy to compute
f(x) for all x G X but knowing y € Y it is computationally infeasible to find any x <E X such that
/(*) = y [88].
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1 and (b(n) = (p - l)(q - 1) is an Euler totient function [114]. The corresponding
decryption key d is calculated as d = e~l

(mod (f)(n)) and can be computed by the

extended Euclidean algorithm. The public key is (n, e) and the secret key is d. The
value of p and q can be discarded afterwards. The permutation / corresponding to
j

this public key (n, e) is given by
f(m) = me

(mod n)

for m G Zn, and the inverse of / can be computed as
f~l(m) = md

(mod n)

The security of R S A algorithm relies on the intractability of factorisation assumption. There are several well-known attacks on R S A [12, 46, 141, 53, 43, 16, 61]
as well as some surveys [68, 15].
There were m a n y attempts to construct alternatives to RSA. The goal was either to improve the efficiency of R S A or to find some other constructions based on
different cryptographic assumptions. The first signature scheme which is based on
the intractability of Discrete Logarithm problems is ElGamal scheme [52]. There
are many variations of this scheme,'including the one to use elliptic curves ([93, 76])
instead of multiplicative groups offinitefields.
E l G a m a l Algorithms
The signer S chooses a prime p such that the discrete logarithm problem in Z*
is intractible. Next, he chooses a primitive element a G Z* and a secret element
a G Z*_v Finally, he computes
0 = aa

(mod p)

The public key is (p, a, (3) and the secret key is a.
To sign a message x G Z*, S selects a random number k eR Z*_x and calculates:
7

=

ak

5

=

(x - aj)k~l

(mod p)
(mod (p - 1))

The signature on x is (7, S).
Everyone can verify whether the signature is authentic by testing whether the
following equation holds with equality:

p-r-y6 I

x
a

(mod p)
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Brief Review of Elliptic Curves

Elliptic curve cryptosystems have attracted much attention in recent years because
of the relatively small size of keys they require. A n elliptic curve over T(p) is the
set of points (x, y) with x,y e F(p) satisfying the equation^
y2 = x3 + ax + b
together with a special element denoted O and called the point at infinity. Addition
operation on the points of an elliptic curve can be defined to make it into an abelian
group [87, 123].
Let Ep(a, b) denotes an elliptic curve of the form
y — x + ax + b mod p
where p is a prime number, x3 + ax + b = 0 mod p does not have multiple roots, and
4a 3 + 2762 ^ 0 mod p.
#Ep(a,b) denotes the order of Ep(a,b) and can be calculated in polynomial
time using algorithms such as Schoof's algorithm [122, 64, 79], and combination of
Schoof's algorithm with Shanks' baby-step giant-step algorithm [87].
Addition in Ep(a, b) is defined as follows. If P = (xx,yx) G Ep(a, b), then — P =
(xx, -yx). If Q = (x2, y2) G Ep(a, b) and Q ^ P, then P + Q = (x3, y3) where
xz =

A 2 - Xx - x2

2/3 =

A(^i - x3) - yi

and

A

(ST

iiP

*Q

Theorem 2.3 [32] The group Ep(a, b) is either cyclic or isomorphic to a product of
two cyclic groups. Furthermore, Ep(a,b) can be rewritten as Zni x Zn2 with n2\nx
and n2\p — 1.
Definition 2.13 [87] An elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem ( E C D L ) is defined as follows. Let a G Ep(a, b) be a point of order q, and let f3 = da. Given a
and P, determine the unique integer d, where 0 < d < q.
E C D L is intractable [87] if the curve is well-chosen. In particular it is an easy
problem for supersingular and anomalous curves.
Elliptic curves have been used to propose some cryptographic algorithms, for
example [93, 71, 77, 80, 47].
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Digital Signatures with Additional Functionality
There are several types of digital signature schemes which provide functionality
beyond authentication and non-repudiation.
I
1. Blind Signature S c h e m e s
Blind signature schemes are two-party protocols between a signer S and a sender H.
Unlike the usual signature schemes, in blind signature schemes, IZ asks <S to sign a
message, but H does not want to reveal the message to <S. At the completion of the
protocol, S knows neither the message that he signed nor the signature associated
with the message.
Blind signature schemes have important applications in electronic cash systems.
A customer A w h o does not want the bank B (the signer in this context) to trace
his electronic coins when he spends them, asks B to sign the coins blindly. Later
when the coins are used and deposited back with the bank B, B will not be able to
trace the coins. The first blind signature scheme was proposed in [33]. The idea is
based on R S A signature scheme. Suppose the bank (or the signer) B has published
his R S A public key (n, e). A chooses a random secret integer k G Zn_x, where
gcd(n,k) = 1, computes the blinded message rh = mke
B. Then, B will sign the blinded message as s = md

(mod n) and sends it to

(mod n) and returns it to A.

Finally, A unblinds the signature by computing s = k_1s

(mod n) which has B's

signature on m .
2. Undeniable Signature Schemes and Confirmer Signature Schemes
Unlike the normal signature schemes, the verification algorithm in undeniable signature schemes requires the cooperation of the signer. If the signer is unwilling to
cooperate, then the signature cannot be verified. This type of signature scheme is
used to protect a signer against the possibility that documents signed by him are
duplicated and distributed electronically without his approval. Thefirstconstruction of undeniable signature schemes was proposed by C h a u m and van Antwerpen
in [35].
In some circumstances, the signer might be unavailable or unwilling to cooperate and hence signatures would no longer be verifiable. To overcome this kind of
shortcoming, C h a u m suggested the notion of confirmer signatures [34]. In confirmer
signatures, the ability to verify or deny signatures is transferred to a designated
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confirmer. In [34], C h a u m also presented a concrete confirmer signature scheme but
without a formal model or proof of security.

3. Group-Oriented Signature Schemes
/

In m a n y cases, a person must sign on behalf of a group or an organisation. In this
case, it is desirable to have a c o m m o n group public key, so that the recipients do not
need to know the individual group member's public key. If the group members are
honest, a single secret key will be generated and given to group members. However,
a problem arises in either of the following cases.
Since each group m e m b e r can sign on behalf of the group, if there is a dispute,
the group m e m b e r w h o has signed the message must be identifiable. In a group
signature scheme, a group m e m b e r can sign a message on behalf of the group such
that everyone can verify the signature but no one can find out which group member
produced the signature. However, there is a trusted authority, called the group
manager, w h o can reveal the identity of the originator of a signature in the case
of dispute. This act is referred to as opening a signature .or also as revocation
of a signer's anonymity. The group manager can either be a single entity or a
number of coalitions of several entities., such as group members. Thefirstgroup
signature scheme was proposed in [37], and was later studied by numerous authors
[38, .39, 96, 73, 99, 72, 30, 22, 4, 3, 23, 24, 133, 84, 134, 132, 135, 27]. The task
becomes more difficult if some members of the group can collude to construct a
signature which is not traceable by the group manager. This has been studied in
the context of coalition-resistant group signature scheme [28, 69, 70, 5, 2].
Threshold Signature S c h e m e s
In a threshold signature scheme a certain quorum of group members are required
to produce a valid signature. Threshold signature schemes were independently introduced by Boyd [18], Croft and Harris [42], and further studied in the context of
threshold cryptography [48]. The main goal of threshold cryptography is to replace
a system entity - such as a transmitter - in a classical cryptosystem with a group of
entities sharing the same power. A threshold cryptosystem must remain secure not
only under the attacks on the original cryptosystem, but also under new types of
attacks that are introduced because of the distributed structure of the system. In a
(t, n) threshold signature scheme [50], signature generation requires collaboration of
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at least t members of a set of n signers. Although construction of threshold signature schemes generally uses a combination of secret sharing schemes and signature
schemes, as noted in [49], a simplistic combination of the two primitives result in a
completely insecure systems that allows the members of arj authorised group to recover the secret key of the signature scheme. In a secure threshold signature scheme,
the power of signature generation must be shared a m o n g n signers in such a way
that t signers can collaborate to produce a valid signature for any given message
whilst no subset of fewer than t participants can forge a signature.
The next issue to be addressed is the role of the trusted authority. In practice
an entity that is trusted by everyone might not exist. This is noted by numerous
authors including S i m m o n s and Ingemarsson [63], and so there is a need for systems
that can function without a globally trusted entity. Eliminating trusted authority
is investigated by authors such as [62, 97, 115].
4. Fail-Stop Signature Schemes
As mentioned earlier, security of an ordinary digital signature scheme relies on a
cryptographic assumption. Therefore, if an enemy is unbounded and can solve the
underlying hard problem, then he can always forge the signature.
Fail-Stop Signature (FSS) schemes were introduced to solve this problem [140,
104, 98]. In an FSS, the enemy is unbounded and the signer is protected in an
information theoretic sense. In the F S S model, the signer and the recipients are
polynomially bounded, while the enemy is assumed to have unlimited computational
power [137, 138, 103].

2.4 Fail-Stop Signature Schemes
An FSS system protects a polynomially bounded signer against a forger who has an
unlimited computational power. If the enemy forges a signature, the presumed signer
with overwhelming probability can provide a proof that a forgery has happened and
the system should be stopped.
A n F S S system m a y be designed for one or more recipients. It is important to
note that a 'single recipient' system only refers to the protection provided against
signer's repudiation, and signature verification (called testing in the context of FSS)
can always be performed by anyone w h o has access to the public key. That is, a single
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recipient system can be seen as an ordinary signature with the added property that a
designated recipient is protected against disavowal of the signature by the signer, and
the signer is protected against an all-powerful forger. These kinds of requirements
are c o m m o n in electronic commerce systems w h e n a customer primarily interacts
with a singlefinancialinstitution, such as a bank. In this case, it is reasonable to
assume that the bank is more powerful and the customer requires protection against
possible forgeries of the bank. At the same time, the bank must be ensured that the
signer cannot repudiate his signature. Using an F S S with a single recipient achieves
both these requirements.
In a single recipient FSS, the role of the trusted centre is played by the recipient
and hence no trusted centre is required. For a general FSS, eliminating the centre
requires a secure multi-party computation (for example, [104, 105, 131]).
A n F S S in its basic form is a one-time digital signature that can only be used
for signing a single message. However, it is possible to extend an F S S scheme to be
used for signing multiple messages [36, 137, 102, 7].
To assess efficiency of an F S S scheme, a number of criteria, including the lengths
of the signature, the secret key and the public key, together with the amount of
computation and communication required for signature generation and verification
(testing), are used.

2.4.1 FSS Schemes
Similar to an ordinary digital signature scheme, an F S S scheme consists of one
polynomial time protocol and two polynomial time algorithms.
1. Key generation: is a two party protocol between the signer and the centre to
generate a pair of secret key, sk, and public key, pk. This is different from
ordinary signature schemes where key generation is performed by the signer
individually and without the involvement of the receiver.
2. Sign: is the algorithm used for signature generation. For a message m and
using the secret key sk, the signature is given by s =

sign(sk,m).

3. Test: is the algorithm for testing acceptability of a signature. For a message
m and signature s, and given the public key pk, the algorithm produces an ok
response if the signature is acceptable under pk. That is test(pk, m, s) = ok.
A n F S S also includes two more polynomial time algorithms:
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4. Proof, is an algorithm for proving a forgery;
5. Proof-test: is an algorithm for verifying that the proof of forgery is valid.
A secure FSS scheme must satisfy the following properties (138, 103, 98].
1. If the signer signs a message, the recipient must be able to verify the signature
(correctness).
2. A polynomially bounded forger cannot create forged signatures that successfully pass the verification test (recipient's security).
3. When a forger with an unlimited computational power succeeds in forging a
signature that passes the verification test, the presumed signer can construct
a proof of forgery and convince a third party that a forgery has occurred
(signer's security).
4. A polynomially bounded signer cannot create a signature that he can later
prove to be a forgery (non-repudiability).
To achieve the above properties, for each public key, there exist many matching
secret keys such that different secret keys create different signatures on the same
message. This condition is outlined as in Figure 2.5.

,

w ^ ™ * " *

. Set of possible secret keys,

^Siven the pubitomy

Figure 2.5: Many-to-one relation between public and secret keys

T h e real signer knows only one of the secret keys, and can construct one of the
m a n y possible signatures. A n enemy with unlimited computing power can generate
all the signatures but cannot determine which one is generated by the true signer
(Figure 2.6). Thus, it would be possible for the signer to provide a proof of forgery
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by generating a second signature on the message with a forged signature, and use
the two signatures to show the underlying computational assumption of the system
is broken, hence proving the forgery (Figure 2.7).
f
Signature space

test(pk, m,s) = ok
Message space

Figure 2.6: Acceptable and Correct Signature

Signature space

Message space

T w o acceptable
signatures
=* proof of forgery

Figure 2.7: Construction of a Proof of Forgery

Security of an F S S can be broken if
1. a signer can construct a signature that he can later prove to be a forgery, or
2. an unbounded forger succeeds in constructing a signature that the signer cannot prove that it is forged.
These two types of forgeries are completely independent and so two different security
parameters, A; and a, are used to show the level of security against the two types of
attacks. More specifically, k is the security level of the recipient and a is that of the
signer. It is proved [98] that a secure F S S is secure against adaptive chosen message
attack and for all c>

0 and large enough k, success probability of a polynomially
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bounded forger is bounded by k c. For an F S S with security level a for the signer,
the success" probability of an unbounded forger is limited by 2~a.

2.4.2 Previous Works on FSS schemes
The first construction of F S S [140] uses a one-time signature scheme (similar to [83])
and results in bit by bit signing of the message, and so is very impractical.
In [100] an efficient single-recipient F S S to protect clients in an on-line payment
system, is proposed. T h e main disadvantage of this system is that signature generation is a 3-round protocol between the signer and the recipient and so is very
expensive in terms of communication. T h e size of the signature is twice the length
of the message.
In [137], an efficient F S S that uses the difficulty of the discrete logarithm problem
as the underlying assumption is presented. In the case of a forgery, the presumed
signer can solve an instance of the discrete logarithm problem, and prove that the
underlying assumption is broken. This is the most efficient scheme known so far and
will be referred to as vHP scheme in this thesis.
In [98, 103], a formal definition of F S S schemes is given and a general construction using bundling homomorphism

is proposed. T h e important property of this

construction is that it is provably secure against the most stringent type of attack,
that is adaptive chosen message attack [60]. T h e proof of forgery is by showing
two different signatures on the same message, the forged one and the one generated
by the valid signer. T o verify the proof of forgery the two signatures are shown to
collide under the bundling homomorphism.

A n instance of this construction uses

the difficulty of factoring as the underlying computational assumption of the system

[138].
It is shown [98, 103] that v H P scheme is in fact an instantiation of this general
construction and so has provable security. This combined with efficiency has made
v H P scheme the benchmark for F S S schemes.
T h e existence condition for F S S is relaxed in [13, 105, 138] and it is shown that
an F S S only exists if one-way permutations exist.
In the following, a general construction given in [98] and outline of its security
properties will be recalled.
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A General Construction for FSS

This construction is for a single-message FSS and uses bundling homomorphism.
Bundling homomorphisms can be seen as a special kind of hash functions.
/

Definition 2.14 [98] A bundling homomorphism

h is a homomorphism

h : G ->• H

between two Abelian groups (G, +, 0) and (H, x, 1) that satisfies the following.
1. Every image h(x) has at least 2T preimages. 2T is called bundling degree of
the

homomorphism.

2. It is infeasible to find collisions, that is two different elements that are map
to the same value by h.
To give a more precise definition, two families of groups, Q = ((?#,+, 0) and
H = (HK, x, 1), and a family of polynomial-time functions indexed by a key, K,
need to be considered. T h e key is determined by the application of a key generation
algorithm g(k, r), on two input parameters k and r. The two parameters determine
the difficulty of finding collision and the bundling degree of the homomorphism,
respectively. Given a pair of input parameters, k,r G N,firstly,using the key generation algorithm, a key K is calculated and then, GK, HK and hK are determined.
For a formal definition of bundling homomcrphisms see Definition 4.1 [98].
A bundling homomorphism can be used to construct an FSS scheme as follows.
Let the security parameters of the F S S be given as k and a. The bundling degree
of the homomorphism, r, will be obtained as a function of a as shown below.
1. Prekey generation: The centre computes K = g(k,r) and so determines a
homomorphism hK, and two groups GK and HK. Let G = GK, H = HK and
h = hx2. Prekey verification: T h e signer must be assured that K is a possible output of
the algorithm g(k,r). This can be through providing a zero-knowledge proof
by the centre or by testing the key by the signer. In any case the chance of
accepting a bad key must be at most 2~°'.
3. Main key generation genA: the signer generates her secret key sk := (skx,sk2)
by choosing skx and sk2 randomly in G and computes pk := (pkx,pk2) where
pki := h(ski) for i = 1,2.
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4. The message space M is a subset of Z.
5. Signing: The signature on a message m G M is,
s — sign(sk,m) = skx +m

x sk2

where multiplying by m is m times addition in G.
6. Testing the signature: can be performed by checking,
pkx x pk™ = h(s)
7. Proof of forgery: Given an acceptable signature s' G G on m such that s' ^
sign(sk,m), the signer computes s := sign(sk,m) and proo/ := (s,s').
8. Verifying proof of forgery: Given a pair (x, x') G G x G, verify that z ^ a;' and
h(x) = h(x').
Theorem 4.1 [98] proves that for any family of bundling homomorphisms and
any choice of parameters the general construction:
»

1. produces correct signature;
2. a polynomially bounded signer cannot construct a valid signature and a proof
of forgery;
3. if an acceptable signature s* + sign(sk, m*) is found the signer can construct
a proof of forgery.
Moreover for two chosen parameters k and a, a good prekey K and two messages
m , m* G M, with m^m*,

let

T:={de

G\h(d) = 1 A (m* - m)d = 0}

(2-1)

Theorem 4.2 [98] shows that given s = ^ n ^ m ) and a forged signature S* G G
such that teSt(p/c,m*,S*) = ok, the probability that s* =

Sign(sk,m*)

is at most

\T\IT and so the best chance of success for an unrestricted forger to construct an
undetectable forgery is bounded by \T\/T. Thus to provide the required level of
security a, \T\/2T < 2~a must be chosen.
This general construction is the basis of all known provably secure constructions
of FSS. It provides a powerful framework by which proving security of a scheme is
reduced to specifying the underlying homomorphism, and determining the bundling
degree and the set T.
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Optimality and Efficiency

Pedersen and Pfitzmann [98] proved that if the security level of the sender is a and
N messages are to be signed, then the size of length parameters are lower bounded
by (N + 1) (a - 1), o and 2a - 1, respectively. These bounds do not depend on the
security level of the receiver which is measured by the parameter k and determines
the size of the of the underlying hard problem(s).
Definition 2.15 [98] An FSS scheme with security parameters k and a is called
optimal with respect to secret key length, public key length or the signature length,
if the lower bound on the corresponding parameter is satisfied with equality.
To compare different FSS schemes, the level of security provided by the schemes
is fixed and the size of the three length parameters is calculated, together with the
number of operations (for example multiplication) required for signing and testing.
The most efficient existing F S S scheme with respect to the first three parameters is
the vHP scheme [137].
Another useful measure is the relative lengths of the message and the signature
[129]. T h e redundancy rate is defined as the length of the signature divided by the
length of the message. Redundancy rate measures efficient use of channel bandwidth.
To use F S S in practice, schemes with low redundancy rate are preferable. If the
length of the signature and the message are denoted by \y\2 and |x|2, respectively,
p = |yj2/|x|2 is a measure of communication efficiency of the scheme. For example,
p = 1 means that to authenticate one bit information, one bit extra (signature)
must be sent over the channel. In v H P scheme [137], p = 2.

2.4.5 Signing Long Messages
A commonly used method of signing an arbitrary long message using a traditional
signature scheme is by employing hash-then-sign method. Using this method, the
message isfirsthashed and then the signature scheme is applied to the hash value.
This is outlined in Figure 2.8.
There are two ways to sign long messages in FSS.
1. Using the hash-then-sign method [98];
2. Creating a specially designed F S S for signing long messages [119].
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M

I Hash(M)
M'

[

I
Signature on M '

Figure 2.8: Hash-then-sign method for Signing Long Messages

Employing the first method, that is hash-then-sign, has two impacts.
• A message M2 such that H(M2) = H(Mx) can replace the message M\ of a
signer, resulting in a successful forgery (Figure 2.6). Hence to prove forgery, it
will be shown that a collision for the collision-resistant hash function is found
(Figure 2.9).
• T h e hash function must be based on a computational assumption. Hash functions with this property developed in [36, 44] require on average one modular
multiplication for one bit of the message and so drastically reduces the speed
of signature generation and testing.
M2

Hash(Ml)^^^—-""""""^
M'

I

Hash(M2)

1

I
Signature on M'

Figure 2.9: Proof of Forgery in Hash-then-Sign method

Due to the second impact, the efficiency of the FSS schemes (number of multiplications required to sign a message) dramatically will be reduced.
Designing an F S S for long messages means an F S S with arbitrarily low p must
be designed. In Chapter 4, such a construction will be developed and in Chapter 5,
its efficiency against the hash-then-sign method will be compared.
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Signing M a n y Messages

To sign multiple messages in FSS schemes, Merkle's authentication tree [89, 90]
approach can be employed [101, 103, 98]. However, this results in a longer secret
key to be stored by the signer. Baric and Pfitzmann [7] employed accumulator [9]
to reduce the length of the secret key. This approach uses a new cryptographic
assumption, that is strong RSA assumption, which has also been used in several
other cryptographic algorithms [1].

2.5 Two Constructions of FSS Schemes
Since its introduction, only two FSS schemes have been proposed: one relying on
discrete logarithm assumption [137] and the other relying on factorisation assumption [138]. These schemes are provably secure and follow the general construction
mentioned in the previous section. These schemes will be briefly recalled in the
following section.
*

2.5.1

van Heijst and Pedersen's FSS Scheme

The first efficient and practical example of F S S was proposed by van Heijst and
Pedersen in [137], which is referred to as vHP scheme in this thesis. The scheme is
constructed from a family of bundling homomorphisms for which finding collisions
is equivalent to computing discrete logarithms. T h e scheme is described as follows:
• Prekey Generation:
This is done by a Trusted Authority TA. However, it can also be achieved by
a coin-flipping protocol [128, 88] and therefore TA is not really necessary.
Let p and q be sufficiently large primes such that q divides p - 1, and let Hq
be the unique subgroup of Z; of order q such that the D L problem in Hq be
intractible [85]. Let g and h be elements of Hq where g ± 1 and logfl(/i) is
defined as the number a G {0, • • •, q - 1} with ga = b (mod p).
T h e value of (p, q, g, h) are published, and the value of a is discarded or being
kept by the TA.
• Key Generation:
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The signer S chooses his secret key (ax,a2,bx,b2) eR Z\ and defines his public
key as
7l

=

a2
a
g ^h

(modp)

72

=

b2
b
g ^h

(modp)

• Signing A Message:
To sign a message m G Zq, S constructs:
Sx =

ax + mbx (mod q)

s2 —

a2 + mb2

(mod q)

and publishes (sx, s2) as his signature on m.
• Verifying A Signature:
A signature (sx,s2) on a message m can be verified by anyone by testing
whether^
ihS2

s

lxl™Lg

(modp)

holds with equality.
» Proof of Forgery:
In the case of forgery, when there is another signature (s\,s'2) which passes
the verification test, the presumed signer S can generate his own signature on
the same message, (Sl, s2), and proves the forgery by performing the following
steps:
g«ifiS2 = g^h*'2
hS2~s* — gs'x~sx
a(s2-s'2) _

a(s2-s'2) =
a =
and reveals \ogg(h).

^si_Sl

(modp)
(mod p)

( m o d p)

s[-sx (modq)
(si-ai)^-^)" 1 ( mod ^
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Security Proof

The above scheme follows the general construction of [98] (Section 2.4.3). That is,
• G = Zq and H = Hg.
i
• The homomorphisms are defined as
h

to,q,g,h) • Zq x Zq -+ Hq; hip^9jh) := gxhy (mod p)

• ski = (ai, a2) G/j Z\, sk2 = (bu b2) eR Z\ and k = r = \q\2.
• Key Generation: On input the security parameters k and a, two prime numbers p and q are chosen as above with \q\2 = max(k,a), and two generators g
and h are randomly chosen from Hq. The key is K := (p,q,g, h).
Hence, to prove security of the scheme the following theorems need to be proven.
Theorem 2.4 Under DL Assumption, the scheme is a family of bundling homo*

morphisrns.
Proof.
• Since the order of Hq is q, then each h{p^g,h) is a bundling homomorphism.
• For every /i G Hq, there are exactly q elements (x, y) of Zq x Zq that h maps to
p: for each x, there is exactly one y with hy = paTx because h is a generator.
• Assume that a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A could compute collisions of h with overwhelming probability. Then, an algorithm D can be constructed that on input (p,q,g,h) computes the discrete logarithm of h with
respect to g as follows:
First, D runs A, and if A outputs a collision, that is (x,y) ± (x',y') with
g*h* = gx'hy' then D computes \ogg(h) as (x' - x)(y - y')'1

( m o d «)• ^

successful with the same probability as A and almost equally efficient. Hence,
it contradicts with D L Assumption.
D

T h e o r e m 2.5 vHP Scheme is secure for the signer.

is
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Proof. According to the Theorem 4.1 in [98], we must find the size of the set T:
T:={deZqx

Zq\h(d) = 1 A (m* - m)d = 0}

T :={deZqx Zq\h(d) = 1 A ord(d)\m'}
for all values of rn' between 1 and q — 1 (m' is the difference between two different
legal messages). Since q is prime, the order of all non-zero elements of Zq x Zq is q.
Hence, (0,0) is the only element of this set T.
Together with the corollary to Theorem 4.2 [98], this implies that it suffices to
D

choose r := a in the proposed scheme.

2.5.3 van Heijst, Pedersen and Pfitzmann's Scheme
This construction is based on a family of bundling homomorphisms defined in [13]
using ideas from [60, 59]. A member of the family is characterised by r and k-hit
integer n = pq, where p, q are prime numbers, and p = 3 and q = 7 mod 8. The
groups are defined as follows:
H = ±QRn/{±l}, and G = Z2r x H
and the operation on G is given by
(a, x) o (6, y) := ((a + b) mod 2T,xoyo

4<a+6> div v)

Elements of H are represented by numbers between 0 and n/2. In this case, H
is used instead of QRn

because membership can be tested efficiently: a number

between 0 and n/2 belongs to H iff its Jacobi symbol is + 1 [98]. The unit element
of G is (0,1), and the homomophism is given by
/i((a,:r)) = ± ( 4 a o x 2 r )
Furthermore, if n is chosen to be at least n = p V where p and q are as above,
and r and s are odd, then for any a,z there is exactly one x so that h((a,x)) - z

[13].
The complete scheme is described as follows:
• Prekey Generation:
The centre chooses the family of the groups as above, and chooses n = fqs,
where r and s are odd, and p ^ 3 and ^

7 mod 8. He also chooses the

function h that defines the homomorphism as above.
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• Prekey Verification:
Firstly, the centre needs to prove in zero-knowledge to the signer <S that n prqs where p and q are primes and congruent to 3 modulo 4 and r and s are odd
numbers [136]. This proof must be such that the probability of cheating the
signer into accepting an incorrect n is at most 2~a [138]. Then, to exclude the
case p = q mod 8, the signer verifies that n = 5 mod 8. Using this verification
process, <S can be sure that the prekey n is good. Then, it must be verified
that the function h defines a correct homomorphism.
• Key Generation: T h e signer «S chooses his secret key (kx, k2) eR G, and defines
his public key as 7i = h(ki), for i = 1,2.
• Signing A Message:
To generate a signature on a message m G {0, • • •, 2P - 1} for any p G N, S
computes
S

—•

A^1»^2

where s*:= (a,x).
• Verifying A Signature:
A recipient can verify validity of a signature by testing the following equality.
7l7™

I h((a, x)) <* 71 = ± 4 a x 2 r 7 2 " m

• Proof of Forgery:
In the case of forgery, where a forged signature, namely s' passes the verification test, the presumed signer S generates his own signature on the same
message, namely s, and shows that s ? s> and uses (s, s>) as the proof of
forgery.
The above scheme follows the general construction of [98]. The parameters to
the above construction are:
. The message space is {0, • • •, 2" - 1} for any

PeN.

• The bundling degree r := a + p.
T h e o r e m 2.6 The above scheme is secure for the signer.
•»nA ThP rpader is referred to Theorem 4.6
Proof. T h e detail of the proof is omitted. The reader
^
page 310-311 of [98].
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Summary

Message authentication scheme is used to protect integrity of the data and enables
the receiver of the authenticated message to be sure that the message is originated
from a true sender. There are two different ways to implement message authentication scheme: using private key algorithms or using public key algorithms. In
the private key setting, both unconditional and computational security can be used,
however, only computational security that can be applied in the public key setting
[51]. In the public key setting, the message authentication scheme is known as digital signature. O n e special type of digital signature is Fail-Stop Signature Schemes
(FSS), which provides information theoretic security for the signer. The general
construction of F S S is given in [98], and two constructions which are provably secure and based on the general construction have been developed in [137, 138]. To
assess the efficiency of F S S schemes, the definition of optimality and efficiency have
been developed [98, 129]. In the next Chapter, other constructions of FSS schemes
will be described and a new general construction will be proposed.

Chapter 3
New FSS Schemes
In this Chapter, n e w F S S schemes are proposed. A s noted in the previous Chapter,
thefirstF S S scheme was proposed by van Heijst and Pedersen (vHP scheme) [137]
and is known to be the most efficient scheme proposed so far. T h e construction is
based an the discrete logarithm problem over the multiplicative group of a finite
field. The drawback of this construction is the size of thefinitefieldwhich needs to
be sufficiently large [85] to prevent against index calculus method attack. T h e first
construction presented in this Chapter is based on elliptic curve [130]. The construction is essentially the same as v H P scheme and is intended to improve the efficiency
of vHP. Next, an F S S scheme based on R S A [131] will be described. However, this
scheme is less efficient than Heijst, Pedersen and Pfitzmann's factorisation scheme
(described in the previous Chapter). It will be also pointed out that the proposed
R S A scheme does not follow the general construction of [98]. and therefore, its security cannot be deduced from the general construction. To resolve this problem,
an efficient scheme based on factorisation and discrete logarithm modulo composite
number [117] will be presented. This scheme has the same efficiency as v H P scheme
and has provable security. Next, an efficient F S S scheme based on factorisation and
discrete logarithm [129] will be studied. This scheme is more efficient than v H P
scheme with respect to its redundancy rate [129].
The constructions of F S S schemes are mainly for one-time digital signature. However, as pointed out in the previous section, it is possible to extend an FSS scheme
to be used for signing multiple messages [36, 137, 102, 7].
Part of this Chapter appeared in the Proceedings of The Fourth Australasian
Conference on Security and Privacy, ACISP
tional Workshop on Security, IWSEC

'99 [130], the Proceedings of Interna-

'99 [131], the Proceedings of The Third In-

ternational Workshop on Information Security - ISW 2000 [111] and The Computer
Journal [129].
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3.1 FSS Based on Elliptic Curve
As mentioned earlier, the problem in vHP scheme comes from the fact that the size
of D L assumption must be chosen to be reasonably large to thwart the attacks, such
as index calculus method. According to Lenstra and Verheul's approximation [85],
to guarantee the security for at least 20 years, that is until year 2020, the size of D L
problem must be chosen such that the group primes of S D L systems is at least 151
bits, and the basic primes is at least 1881 bits. However, by using Elliptic Curve
systems, the same security can be achieved with only 161 bit keys [85].

3.1.1 FSS Scheme based on Elliptic Curves
Model
The model of this scheme is similar to [45]. In this model, there is a centre, TA
who is trusted by the recipients (and not necessarily by the sender), w h o sets up
the system, but is not involved in signature generation or verification. There is a
sender, S, w h o has a secret key. A recipient can verify a signature by using the
sender's public key. In the case of dispute, the sender can prove that he can solve
E C D L problem.
The scheme is described as follows:
• Prekey Generation:
1. TA chooses an elliptic curve such that q = #Ep(a,b) is also prime
( L e m m a 3.2).
2. TA

randomly chooses a point a G Ep(a,b), and a number d G F(q).

H e calculates p = da over Ep(a, b) and discards d. Finally he publishes

(Ep(a,b),q,a,P).
A simple algorithm to find such a curve is to randomly select a curve, find its
order, discard the curve if the order is non-prime and repeat the process. It is
conjectured that this type of curve can be obtained in 0(1/log P) [78].

3.1. FSS Based on Elliptic Curve

42

Key Generation:
1. S checks to see if a and P belong to Ep(a,b). If not, reject the public
parameters.
2. If the public parameters are accepted, S chooses a 4-tuple, (kx, k2, k3, A:4),
h G T(q), 1 < i < 4, as his secret key.
3. S computes
ax = k3a + kx P over Ep(a, b)
a2 = k±a + k2 P over Ep(a, b)
and publishes (ax,a2) as his public key.

• Signing A Message:
To generate the signature for a message m G F(q), S computes
Sl

= kxm + k2 mod q

s2 — k3m + /C4 mod q
and publishes {su s2) as his signature on m .
• Verifying A Signature:
A recipient can verify validity of a signature by testing the following equality.
s2a + sxP = max + a2 over Ep(a, b)

• Proof of Forgery:
In the case of forgery, where a forged signature, namely ( s ^ ) passes the
verification test, the presumed signer 5 can provide a proof of forgery by
executing several steps:
1. Construct his o w n signature, (sx,s2), on m .
2. Compute d = ^jnod

,, and use this value as the proof of forgery.

Theorem 3.1 // there is a for9ed signature that passes the verification test, the
sender is able to solve ECDL

problem.
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Proof: Suppose there exists a forged signature, (si,s2), on a single message M,
that passes the verification test. T h e presumed sender produces his own signature, (si,s2), which also passes the verification test. In this case, the following two
equations hold:

/
s2a + SxP = max + ®2 over Ep(a, b)

and
s'2a + s[P = max + OL2 over Ep(a, b)

Thus,
s2a + SxP = s'2a + s[p over Ep(a, b)
s2a - s'2a —

s[p - SxP over Ep(a, b)

(s2 - s'2)a =

(s[ - Sx)P over Ep(a, b)

(s2-s'2)

=

(s[ - sx)da over Ep(a, b)

(3.1)

=

(s[ -

(3-2)

Sl)d

mod q

" S* mod q
s\ - Sx

S2
d

=

(3-3)

The correctness of deriving equation 3.2 from 3.1 is ensured by the following
lemmas.
L e m m a 3.2 [87, 128, 19] Any elliptic curve Ep(a,b), where q = #Ep(a,b) is also
prime, forms a cyclic group, which is isomorphic to F(q).

Thus, any point other

than the point at infinity is a generator of Ep(a,b).
L e m m a 3.3 // there is an equation of the form,
Cj

= aj + bj

over a curve Ep(a,b) where a,b,c G T(q) and 7 G Ep(a,b), and q = *Ep(a,b) is
prime, then we have
c=

a

+ b mod q

3.1.2 Second Model of FSS Scheme
The F S S proposed above can be used in the second model of FSS signatures, that is
without a trusted party [138], by allowing a recipient to play the role of the trusted
party and hold the value d, secret from the sender. In this case the system set-up
phase in section 3.1.1 will be performed by the recipient.
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3.2 FSS Scheme Based on RSA
The first FSS scheme based on factorisation described in Chapter 2.5.3 is
efficient as vHP scheme (see also Chapter 5 for the complete comparison). In this
section, an FSS scheme which based on R S A algorithm [114] will be proposed.
The idea of the following scheme can be intuitively described as follows. Assuming that factorisation problem is hard, given an n = pq, it would be infeasible for the
signer S tofindthe non-trivial factors of n. However, in the case of forgery, S will
obtain some information about a multiple of <£(n), and by using this information,
he would be able tofindthe non-trivial factors of the modulus [128], and prove that
a forgery has happened.
Model
Thefirstmodel of the scheme is similar to [137, 45], and requires a trusted party.
A trusted dealer V initialises the system. The sender <S chooses his own secret key,
and obtains some key information from V. Next, he constructs his public key, and
publishes it. To sign a message S uses his secret key. A receiver can verify the
signature by using the sender's public key. In the case of forgery, the sender can
prove that he can reveal the factors of n, and hence break the underlying RSA
assumption.
The required assumption is that there exists an authenticated channel between
V and S in the initialisation phase. This can be achieved easily, for example, by
using a public key encryption algorithm. The scheme is described as follows:
• Prekey Generation:
V chooses two large safe primes p and q, such that
p = 2p' +1 and q = 2q' + 1
where p' and q' are also prime numbers [11, 12], and computes n = pq and
<j>(n) =

(p-l)(q-l).

Next, he chooses an arbitrary a G Z*n, chooses his secret key dD, such that
gcd(dD,d>(n)) = 1, and computes eD = tfmod cf>(n). Finally he calculates
P = ad°mod n, publishes (a, n), and sends (eD, P) to S via a secure channel.
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• Key Generation:
S chooses his secret key consisting of 4 non-zero integers kx, k2, k3, kA; k{ G Z*n;
1 < i < 4. 5 receives X>'s input, namely (eD,p), computes

Pl =

k4 k3
a P mod

n '

ax = ak3Pklmod n and a2 = akiPk2mod n
and publishes (ax,a2,Px) as his public key.
• Signing A Message:
To sign a message m G Z*, S computes
Sx = kxm + k2 and s2 = k$m + k^
and publishes (si,s2) as his signature on m.
• Verifying A Message:
Everyone can verify whether
aS2P[l = a^a-2. mod n
holds. If true, the signature is valid.
For correctness, note that:
aS2P{1 mod n
*ak*si+dDk3Sl mod n

s

=

a

—

ak3m+k4ak4(kix+k2)+dDk3(kix+k2)

_
_

m0^

n

k3m+k1k4Tn+dDk1k3mak4+k2k4+dDk2k3Tn0(i
ak3m+kix(k4+k3dD)a^+k2(k4+k3dD)mo(i

n

n

= ak3Tnpkirnak4Pernod n
—

a™a2 mod n

D
Proof of Forgery:
In the case of forgery, where a forged signature, (s[, s'2), passes the verification
test, the presumed signer S can prove that a forgery has happened by taking
the following steps
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1. Construct his signature on m, (sx,s2).
2. Compute Zx = (s[ - sx) and Z2 = (s2 - s2).
3. Compute 7 = e D ( Z 2 - kAZx) - kzZx = c(f)(n) (see L e m m a 3.5).
4. Use Miller-Bach algorithm [92, 6, 55, 128] tofindnon-trivial factors of n.
Steps of the algorithm are as follows
(a) Let 7 = 2hz, where he Z and z is odd.
(b) Choose a random number a G Z*n and define z0 - azmod n where
z0^l.
(c) For i = 1, 2, • • •, calculate 2* = z\_xmod n until z* = 1
(d) If Zi_x = —1 mod n, then repeat step 4(b).
(e) Obtain a non-trivial factor of n by calculating gcd(z^x + l,n) where
i is the smallest index with Zj = 1.
5. The non-trivial factors of n is the proof of forgery.
i

3.2.1

Security Proof

-,

For the security proof, it will be proven that the. requirements for FSS are satisfied
in the above scheme. Later on, it will be shown that this scheme does not follow
the general construction of [98] and therefore, it does not provide security against
adaptive chosen message attack [60].
Lemma 3.4 There are (j)(n)2 equally likely secret keys that match with the sender's
public key.
Proof.
Knowing a public key (ax,a2,Px), gives the following three equations,
ax = ak3Pklmod n
a2 = akipk2mod
px =

k4 k3
a P mod

n
n = ak4+dok3mod

n

To find all the possible matching secret keys one has
w = loga Px mod n = h + doh
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and the two equations

ai

=

ak3Pklmodn

and a2

=

ak*pk2modn

ak3+klWmodn

and a2

~

aki+k2Wmod n

which can be written as

Ql

=

By solving the discrete logarithm problem, one can obtain (in mod (j)(n))
k$ + kxw

=

Cx and k± + k2w

= c2

for ci,c2 G Z*n. Equivalently

f h\
w 0 1 0\
0 w 0 1)

k2
k3
k

cx

mod (f)(n)

(3.4)

c2

K *J
These equations contain 4 variables and the rank of coefficient matrix is 2, and
so for each choice of /c3 and k4 ((j)(n)2 possibilities), there is a different solution.
Note that w =fc4+ dDk3 adds one extra equation and one extra variable (dD), and
so need not be considered in (3.4).
Lemma 3.5 If the signer receives a forged signature (s[, s2) on a message m, which
passes the verification test, and is different from his own signature, (sx,s2), on m,
then he can factorise n.
Proof.
Since both (Sl, s2) and (sl5 s'2) pass the verification test, it can be concluded that
aS2P[l
aS2ak4Si+dDk3si

s2+k4Si+dDk3si

=

aS2Pl1mod
5

n

i+ < k fc35 'imod n

_

a «2 a *4

_

,
aS2+k4S 1+dDk3s'lrn0(]i n

a
s2 + k4sx + dDk3sx

=

(s2 - s'2) + k4(Sl - s[) =

s'z +

(s[ - sx)dDk3 mod d>(n)

_ (s2-s'2) + h(sx-j\)_rrind

w

k^+dnhs^mod^n)

(s[ - sx)k3

^

(3.5)
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Note that S does not know the value of <j>(n) and so cannot compute the inverse
in (3.5). However by multiplying both sides of (3.5) by eD and noting that eDdD =
1 mod (f>(n), S can calculate a multiple of (f)(n),
eD(Z2 - kAZx) - Zxk3 = ccj)(n)
where Zx — s[ - sx and Z2 — s2 — s2.
N o w <S can use Miller-Bach algorithm to find non trivial factors of n.

•

The following l e m m a ensures the correctness and efficiency of proof of forgery.
Lemma 3.6 (Miller-Bach [92, 6, 55, 128]) Let n be an odd integer which has
at least two distinct prime factors, and x / 0 be a multiple of X(n). Pick a random
number a G Z*, and write x = 2hz, where z is odd. Define z0 - azmod n, and z{ =
z\_xmodn, for i = 1,2, • • • Let r be minimal with zr = l. For at least half the choices
of a, a A(n)/2 ^ ± 1 mod n, and for these choices of a, r / 0 and gcd(zr-x + l,n) is
a non-trivial factor of n.
Theorem 3.7 The signer cannot prove a forgery with probability = 1- ^y.
Proof. Given a forged signature that passes the verification test, the presumed
signer cannot generate a different signature which passes the verification test with
negligible probability: ^ _ , where <f>{n) is the number of possible signatures on a
message. Next, the presumed signer can calculate the dealer's private key, and
construct c<j)(n), for c G Z\

Knowing c<j)(n) and n, he can factorise n by using

Miller-Bach algorithm and find the non trivial factors of n.
Theorem 3.8 Knowing the public key together with the signature for a message m,
an enemy with unlimited computational power can calculate <j>(n) possible secret keys
that could have been used for signing the message.
Proof.
Knowing the public key, (aua2,Pi),
Sl

and the signature on m , namely

= kxm + k2 and s2 = k3m + kA

the enemy with unlimited power can solve the discrete logarithm and factorization
problem and rewrite these equations byfirstobtaining w = loga Px - h + dDh an
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RSA

then writing
cx =

kz + wkx mod 0(n)

c2

h + wk2 mod (j>(n)

=

(3.6)
s[ =
s2 =

k\m + k2 mod (f)(n) ^
k^m + fc4 mod (f)(n)

where ci, c2 G Z* and (s'l5 s'2) is an acceptable signature on m . Then, he can rewrite
these equations as follows
( cx\

1 0\
0 ry 0 1
m 1 0 0

/ w

\ 0

0

0 m

c2

m o d 0(n)

yi

1 / \kA

J

y2

It is easy to see that this matrix has rank 3 (This is true because wr3-r2-mrx+r,

=

0, where n is the ith row of the matrix, and noting that the submatrix consisting of
thefirst3 columns has 3 independent rows), and so there are exactly <f>(n) solutions
•
to this equation.
Corollary 3.9 An enemy with unlimited computational power cannot compute the
signer's signature on a new message.
Proof. This proof can be deduced from Theorem 3.8.
Theorem 3.10 A computationally bounded signer cannot make signatures which he
can later prove to be forgeries.
Lemma 3.11 Different secret keys that match with the sender's public key and pes
the verification test for a message m create different ^natures on m> * m .
Proof. As shown in theorem 3.8, knowing the public key and the signature on m
the enemy with unlimited computing power can obtain equation 3^6 whrch lead t
,(„) possible secret keys. If there is another signature « , 4 ) wh.ch also passes the
verification test, then there are two additional equations that can be gathered
(3.7)

= fc,m' + k2 mod <P(n)
=

k3m' + h mod <t>{n)
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Combining (3.6) and (3.7), he can write
/

V

w
0

0 1 o^
w 0 1

m

1

0

0ml

0 0

m' 1 0 0
0 0 m' 1

(

( h\
^2

cx\
c2
Si

s2

V h J
I

\s2J

The coefficient matrix has rank 4 (since m ^ m ' ) , and hence there is only one unique
n

solution.

Theorem 3.7, 3.8, 3.10 show that the proposed scheme satisfies all the requirements of F S S [98].
Note that the secret key is a one-time key. If two different messages are signed
using the same secret key, the secret key can be obtained uniquely from the signatures.
*

3.2.2 Second Model of FSS based on RSA
The F S S proposed above can be used m the second model of F S S signatures, that
is without a trusted party [138]. In the second model, there is no trusted party
needed for setting u p the system. T h e initialization step mentioned in section 3.2 is
performed by the sender S and the receiver using the method described in [17].
In the initialisation step, there are three parties involved, the sender S, the
receiver II, and a helper. T h e steps are as follows [17].
1. Firstly, they perform a distributed computation of n (where n = pq, but no
one knows the value of p and q). T h e result of this step is the value of n.
2. Then, they perform a distributed primality test to verify whether n is a product
of two primes. If the test fails, repeat step 1.
3. Next, S and <Jl agree on a public value eD \ and perform a distributed key
generation. A t the end of this step, each of S and K holds a partial information
of the secret key dD, where dD = ds + dR and dDeD = 1 mod <f>(n).
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4. S sends his partial secret key information ds to 71, so that TI can construct
the secret key as dD — ds + dR.
5. % chooses an arbitrary a G Z*, and calculates P = ad°mod n.
i

6. 71 publishes (a,n), and sends P to S securely.
The rest of the scheme work as the previous one. It is worth noting that there
is no trusted party needed for setting up the system.
Note that three parties are involved in the set up of the system. In this case,
a helper is needed, since the Boneh and Franklin's protocol [17] is used. However
other methods of distributed computation of n and distributed primality test can
also be used. Recently, an efficient and robust method of distributing key generation
of R S A is proposed [54]. This construction can be used to construct a scheme which
is RSA-based, corresponds to the second model of Fail-Stop Signature, and does not
need a helper. The distributed computation of n and the distributed primality test
are done only by S and 71, and the set up procedure is robust and efficient. A more
recent approach described in [57] can also be used to eliminate the helper.

3.2.3 More Efficient Proof of Forgery
The scheme in the previous section uses Miller-Bach algorithm for proving the
forgery. In this section, an alternative scheme is given that allows the proof of
forgery without using this algorithm (and factoring n), but by showing the signer
can decrypt an R S A encrypted message by only knowing the public information.
The scheme works as follows.

• Prekey Generation:

Similar to the original scheme, V calculates (a,p,n). Then V chooses a rand o m message m G Z*, computes
M — meDmod

n

and publishes M together with (a, n); m is kept secret. Next, he sends (eD,
to <S via a secure channel. As noted in section 3.2.2, this step can be done
without the dealer, but only by the collaboration of the sender and the receiver.
In this case, the random message m is chosen by the receiver.
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• Key Generation, Message Signing and Message Verification work as before.
• Proof of Forgery:
In the case that a forged signature, (s[,s2), on a message m , passes the verification test, the signer S can prove a forgery as folldws.
1. Construct his own signature, (si,s2), on m
2. Compute Zx = (s[ — Si) and Z2 — (s2 - s2)
3. Compute 7 = ev(Z2 — k±Zx) — Zxfo
4. Compute 7' = ^(fe^)
5. Compute dl = e^mod
6. Reveal m = Md'mod

(47')
n as the proof of forgery

Proof. It is known that
do = ef^mod 4>(n)
and
y = eD(Z2-k4Zx)-Zxk3

= cxp'q'

forCl G Z". The c o m m o n factor of eD and ci is eliminated, if it exists, as follows
'

7
gcd(eD,i)

Because <f>{n) = 4 p V , then by calculating d' = e ^ m o d (47), S can obtain d' =
dD mod cf>(n). Thus, 5 can reveal m by computing m = M d ' m o d n and use it as the
D
proof of forgery.

3.2.4 Remarks on the scheme
The proposed FSS scheme based on R S A scheme does not follow the general construction of [98], since the signature generation is done over Z which is not a finite
group. That is, the signature generation is defined as,
ki,kjeZ<Kn);gm = kim

+ k

J

and the mapping is defined as,

h „s = akiBkj (mod n), h,kj G Z^n)

3.3. FSS based on Factorisation and DL modulo Composite Number

53

This means that knowing the public key of S there are at most <f>(n)2 equally likely
secret keys that match with the sender's public key (c.f. L e m m a 3.4). The actual
number of matching secret key depends on the message and the secret key and so
the condition of theorem 4.1 [98] is not satisfied.
One way offixingthis problem is by changing the signature generation as,
ki, kj G Zftn)\ gm = hm + kj (mod </>(n))
which results in the bundling homomorphism given by,
• Families of groups: Let n = pq. Define GK = Z^n) and HK = Zn.
• The homomorphism: /i(Pjg)Q,0) is defined as:
h{p,q,a,p) : Zm x ZtfB) -> Z*n, h, kj G Z*B); hp,q,a^ = akiPk* (mod n)
This revised system follows the general construction of [98] but is not secure as the
value of <f>(n) must be k n o w n by the signer (it is required in the signature generation).
This is because of the knowledge of n and <f>{n) allows the sender to factorise n [128].
In the next section, an F S S construction based on factorisation and D L modulo
composite number will be presented that will give an alternative solution to this
problem.

3.3 FSS based on Factorisation and DL modulo
Composite Number
This section will describe an efficient FSS scheme based on factorisation and discrete
logarithm modulo composite number that follows the general construction of [98].
W e use an approach similar to [58] and the resulting scheme will not have the
problem of the scheme in the previous section.
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Model
There is a centre, TA who is trusted by the recipients (and not necessarily by the
sender), who sets up the system, but is not involved in signature generation or
verification. There is a polynomially bounded sender, S, who has a secret key. A
polynomially bounded recipient can verify a signature by using <S's public key. In
the case of dispute, the presumed sender can prove that the underlying instance
of discrete logarithm problem modulo a composite number has been broken. The
existence of TA can easily be eliminated by replacing his role in the prekey generation
phase with a coin-flipping protocol.
• Prekey Generation:
Given the two security parameters k and a, TA chooses two prime numbers
p and q, where p = 2/p' + 1 and q = 2fq' + 1 and f,p', q' are also prime and
|/|2 must be chosen such that subgroup discrete logarithm problem for the
multiplicative subgroup of order / in Z*n is intractible and obtains n •= pq.
For example, |n|2 « 1881 bits and |/|2 « 151 bits [85]. Then, he chooses an
element* a G Zn of order / both modulo p and modulo q. Therefore, the order
of a modulo n is also /. Let Qf denote the subgroup of Z*n generated by a. T A
also chooses a secret random number a G Qf and computes P = aa
Finally, he publishes (n, /, a, p) and keeps (p, q, a) secret.
• Prekey Verification:
Prekey Verification will be by the sender S verifying
0/•= 1

(mod n)

A prekey is good if the above equation holds with equality.
• Key Generation:
S chooses ax,a2,bx,b2 G Zf as his secret key, computes
a2
a
ll=a 'P

(modn)

and

72 = ablPb2

(mod n)

and publishes (71,72) as his public key.
• Signing A Message:
To sign a message m G Zf, S computes
Sl

= ax + bxm

(mod/)

and

s2 = a2 + b2m

(mod/)

(mod n).
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and publishes (si, s2) as his signature on m.
• Testing A Signature:
(sx,s2) passes the verification test if the following equation holds with equality:
7l7™

L

Sl S2
a

p

(modn)

• Proof of Forgery:
If there is another signature (s[, s2) on a message m which also passes the verification test, then the presumed signer can produce his own signature (sx, s2)
on m , and follow the steps below,
Sl S2
a

p

= as'ips* (modn)
a(si-s[)

=

a{si-s\) =

(sx - s[) =
a

=

pM-'t) (modn)
aa(s'2-s2)

(modn )

a(s2 - s2) (mod /)
(sx-s[)(s2-s2)-1

(mod/)

to obtain a as the proof of forgery. In effect the presumed signer has proven
that he can solve an instance of discrete logarithm problem which has been
assumed to be hard.

3.3.1 Security Proof
The proposed scheme follows the general construction of [98].
Bundling H o m o m o r p h i s m
• Families of groups: Let n = pq. Define GK = Zf and HK = Z*.
• The homomorphism: /i(P,g,/,a,/3)

is

defined as:

Since this construction follows the general construction in [98], therefore, it is
required to prove the following theorems [98].
T h e o r e m 3.12 Under Discrete Logarithm and Factorisation Assumptions, the above
construction is a family of bundling homomorphism.
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Proof. To show that the above definition is a bundling homomorphism, it requires
to show that (definition 4.1 [98]),
1. For any value u G Z*n which is an image of Zf x Zf, there are / preimages in
Zf. Moreover, given a p as above, it is hard to findk pair (Cl,c2) G Zf x Zf
such that p = aclP°2

(mod n).

2. It is hard to find two pairs (yi,y2), (y[,y'2) G Zf x Zf that map to the same

peZ*n.
To prove 1, it is noted that knowing p = ac = aClP°2 (mod n), for P = aa
(mod n) and ordn(a) = /, there exists exactly / different values of (ci,c2) in Zf,
given by c = Ci + ac2

(mod / ) . Hence, there are / preimages for p in Zf. It is also

noted that given p = a C l + a C 2

(mod n), since ordn(a) = f, then finding (cx + ac2)

is equivalent to solving discrete logarithm in a subgroup of size / in Z* which is
known to be difficult [85].
It is easy to see that if the signer could solve discrete logarithm modulo a composite number problem, then he could derive a from a and P and find another secret
key that matches with his public key. O n the other hand, if the signer could solve
factorisation problems, then he could obtain
Pp = a\ (modp) and pq = a\ (mod q)
where for X = a and P, Xc denotes X (mod c). Since the size of |p|2 and |g|2 are
not chosen such that discrete logarithm in these multiplicative groups are hard, then
the signer could find a and a and by using a Chinese-Remainder Theorem obtain
a. This allows him to find another secret key, and construct a signature that he
can deny at a later stage. Therefore, the system is secure only if discrete logarithm
modulo composite number and factorisation problems are hard.
Property 2 means that it is difficult tofind(y1? y2) and (y[, y'2) such that a^Py2 =
0/1/?^

( m o d n). Suppose that there is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm

A that could compute such collision. Then, an algorithm D can be constructed,
that on input (n, /,a, P), where P = aa

(mod n) and ordn(a) = /, outputs a as

follows:
First, D runs A, and if A outputs a collision, that is <&?»
0/1,2/2) ± (y'x,y'2), then D computes:
avipy2

—

ofi'ipy'i

(mod n)

= *HV'2

(mod n), for
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(l/i - Vi) = a(2/2 - 2/2) (mod /)
a

=

(yi-y[){y'2-y2)~l

(mod/)

D is successful with the same probability as A and almost equally efficient. Hence,
it contradicts the discrete logarithm assumption.

'

•

To find the security level of the signer Theorem 4.2 of [98] is followed and the
size of the set T is computed:
T := {(ci, c2) eZfx

Zf\aCl+aC2

= 1

(mod n) A m'( C l + ac2) = 0}

for all values of m! between 1 and / - 1 , given that the prekey is good. Since (0,0) is
the only element of this set, then the size of the set T is 1. This proves the following
theorem.
T h e o r e m 3.13 In the proposed FSS Scheme a = r.

3.4 FSS Based on Factorisation and Discrete Logarithm
In this section, an efficient FSS based on factorisation and discrete logarithm which
is an instance of the general construction [98] will be presented. In Chapter 5 it
will be shown that this scheme has a lower redundancy rate compared to the v H P
scheme. Proof of forgery is by revealing the secret factors of a modulus and so
verifying the proof is very efficient. First we describe a single recipient model and
then, extend it to multiple recipient.
The scheme is as follows:
Model
There is a single recipient, 71 w h o also plays the role of the trusted centre and
performs prekey generation of the scheme.
• Prekey Generation:
Given the two security parameters k and <r, H ehooses two large safe primes
P

and ,. Then, K finds a prime P such that n = n divides P - 1. Finally

U selects an element a such that the multiplicative order of a modulo P .s p
(ordP(a) = p). a, n and P are sent to the signer via an authenticated channel.
(More details on selection of these parameters are grven below.)
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• Prekey Verification:
If the receiver is trusted, the prekey will be accepted by the signer S and no
prekey verification is needed (as in [137]). O n the other hand, if the receiver
is not trusted, a zero-knowledge proof is needed to assure that the prekey is
correct. This issue will be discussed in the next section (multiple recipient
scheme).
• Key Generation:
S chooses kx,k2 G Zn and computes
ax = akl mod P
a2 = ak2 mod P
The private key is (A^, k2) and the public key is (ai,o;2).
• Signing A Message:
To sign* a message x G Zn, S computes
y = kxx + k2 mod, n
and publishes y as his signature on x.
• Verifying a Signature:
y passes the test if
ay = a\a2 mod P
holds.
Proof of Forgery:
If there is a forged signature y' which passes the test, the presumed sender can
generate his own signature, namely y, on the same message, and the following
equation will hold:
= ay' mod P

y
a

or
y =
y-y'

=

y' mod p
cp, c G Z
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Hence, a non-trivial factor of n can be found by computing gcd(y-y', n). Note
that "the probability of y = y', and the proof of forgery cannot be provided, is
1/q, which is negligible.
We note the following remarks on the key generation algorithm. In [139], it is shown
that for a randomly selected n, P such that n divides P - 1 is upper bounded by
n login. Moreover if |n|2 = k, then on average it takes 0(log k) probabilistic steps
tofindsuch a P. A n element a is selected such that the multiplicative order of a
modulo P is p (ordp(a) = p). This element can be easily found, by, for example,
randomly choosing an element a G Z*P and calculating a = (a) C9 mod P, for
= £=!. If a 7^ 1, then a has order p. This is in fact "pushing" the element a into

c

a subgroup of order p.
Moreover, by the prime number theorem (general form due to Dirichlet, Hadamard
and de la Vallee Poussin [81]), for afixedn with P = tn + 1 < N, there are roughly
1

N

nn(N)

<f>(n) In N

P's which are less than N and are primes. Note that N > tn + 1 and n > <f>(n).
Hence, a safe estimation can be derived that
n(N)
IX

t
ln(tn + l)

Since the primality test procedure uses t = 1,2, • • •, then with a non-trivial probability two primes will show up when t reaches ln(tn + 1). Hence, it can be assured
that t is small and the prime P is easy to be found.

3.4.1 Security Proof
W e show that this scheme is an instance of the general construction with the following bundling homomorphism.
Discrete Logarithm Bundling H o m o m o r p h i s m
. key generation g: on input k and r, two primes p and q with \q\2 = r, and
|p|2 * \q\2, a prime P such that n divides P - 1 and |„|a = *, and an element
a of order p is chosen. The key will be K = (p, ?,«, ^ ) . /amz/ie5 0/ ^ro«P5: Let n = pg. Define GK = ^n and ^ = ^>-
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• The homomorphism h(p,q,ap) is
h(p,q,a,P) : Zn-t Z*P, /i(P)(?)Q!p)(x) = ax (mod P)
Theorem 3.14 Under DL and Strong Factorisation assumptions (Definition 2.10),
the above construction (Section 3.4-1) is a family of bundling homomorphisms.
Proof. To show that the above definition is a bundling homomorphism, it must be
shown that
1. For any p G Zp where p = ac (mod P), there are q preimages in Zn.
2. For a given p G Zp where p = ac (mod P), it is difficult to find c such that
ac = p

(mod P).

3. It is hard to find two values c,ce Zn that map to the same value.
To prove property 1, it is noted that knowing p = ac (mod P) for c^Z*n and
ordP(a) = p, there are exactly q values c', given by c' = c + ip, i = 0, • • • q - 1, for
which ad = ac+ip = ac. Hence, there are q preimages of p in Z*.
N o w given p = ac

(mod P ) , finding c is equivalent to solving an instance of

D L problem, which is hard (property 2).
Property 3 means that it is difficult tofindc and c such that ac = ac

(mod P ) .

Suppose that there is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A that could compute such a collision. Then, an algorithm D is constructed that on input (P,n,a),
where n\P - 1, outputs the non-trivial factors of n as follows:
First, D runs A, and if A outputs a collision, that is y and y, y ^ y such that
ay = ay

(mod P ) , then D computes:

ay = ay mod P
y =
y_ y =
p =

y mod p
cp c G Z
gcd(y-y,n)

D is successful with the same probability as A and almost equally efficient. Hence,
it contradicts with the strong factorisation assumption.

T h e o r e m 3.15 Our FSS scheme is secure for the signer.
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According to the Theorem 4.1 in [98], the size of the set T must be found:

T:={deZn\ad = l/\ (m*-m)d = 0}
or ,
T — {deZn\ad

= lA m'd = 0}

in ZP. There are exactly q d's that satisfy thefirstequation ad = 1 mod P. Since
m* ^ m, we have m ' G {1,2,•••n-l} and so there is a unique message (namely,
m' = q) that satisfies m'd = 0

(mod n). Hence, |T| = 1.

Together with theorem 4.2 [98], this implies that it suffices to choose r = a in
the proposed scheme, as was done in section 3.2.2.

3.4.2 Multiple Recipient Scheme
Although F S S schemes have been mainly studied for a single recipient, it is not
difficult to extend the scheme to multiple recipients. In fact, the only difference
in that case is to include a trusted center and provide zero-knowledge proofs that
show that the chosen parameters of the prekey have the correct forms. That is, it is
needed to ensure that n, P and a, have the desired forms. Using [26], an element n
can be proven to be an R S A modulus n = pq, where both p and q are safe primes.
Then, P is tested for primality. This can be done by using various primality testing
algorithms such as the Miller-Rabin probabilistic primality test [128] which runs in
polynomial time. Finally it is verified that n divides P - 1. Although it is easy
to show that the order of a is a multiple of p (without knowing p, for example by
verifying an = 1

(mod P)), but showing that the order is strictly p needs more

effort. The zero knowledge proof of ordP(a) = p can be achieved by combining the
idea mentioned in section 3.2 and 4.2 of [26]. More precisely, the prover has to prove
that he knows p that satisfies aP = 1 mod P, and p is a prime number. O n the
other hand, after verifying this proof, the receiver (or the sender in the context of
this paper) only needs to check whether an = 1 mod P, and hence, proving that
ap = 1 mod P.

3.5 Summary
In this Chapter, four new FSS schemes have been proposed. The first scheme is
an FSS based on Elliptic Curve [130]. The scheme is essentially the same as the
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one proposed [137], but replaces the original verification process on the cyclic group
generated by a generator of T(p) with the cyclic group generated by a point on
a suitably chosen elliptic curve. T h e main advantage of it is lowering the size of
the prime. Then, an F S S scheme based on R S A [131] was described. However, the
scheme does not follow the general construction of [98], and it has some security
problems. T h e F S S scheme based on factorisation and discrete logarithm modulo
composite number [117] solves this problem, and has the same efficiency as the
vHP scheme (see Chapter 5 for detail). Finally, an F S S based on factorisation and
discrete logarithm [129] is presented. A s will be shown in Chapter 5, this scheme
outperforms the v H P scheme with respect to the redundancy rate and so provides
a more efficient solution for signing messages of size £, 151 < £ < 1881 bits [85].

Chapter 4
FSS Based on Authentication Codes
All the previous F S S schemes follow the general construction of [98] and result in
schemes that are less efficient or at the best have efficiency similar to the v H P
scheme. T h e purpose of this Chapter is to propose a n e w general construction of
FSS and construct n e w schemes based on it.
First a general construction of F S S schemes based on authentication codes will be
described and its security is proved. It will also be shown that the scheme proposed
in the section 3.4 can also be explained using this general construction. However it
is not known*if the two general constructions are equivalent. Next an FSS scheme
based on linear authentication scheme will be proposed. This scheme follows the
general construction proposed in this Chapter and has the unique property that the
length of the message can be arbitrarily chosen. In fact, this scheme is specially
designed for signing long messages.
Part of this Chapter appeared in the Workshop on Cryptography and Combinatorial Number

Theory (CCNT

'99) [118] and the Proceedings of The First International

Conference on Cryptology in India, Indocrypt 2000 [119].

4.1 Introduction
In this Chapter, a method of constructing FSS schemes from authentication codes
will be described. T h e method requires two families of A-codes and two families of
collision intractable hash functions, one with bundling property, that satisfy certain
conditions. T h e security of the receiver relies on the collision intractiblity of the
hash functions and security of the sender can be derived from the bundling property
of the hash function and the structure of the A-codes. This provides an alternative
method to [98] for constructing F S S with provable security. W e will show that a
construction proposed in [129] (and also described in the section 3.4) can also be
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regarded as an example of this method.
In a systematic Cartesian authentication code, a codeword m is the concatenation
of a message s and a tag t, that is: m = (s,t). A Cartesian A-code with a message
space M , a tag space T and key space E is denoted b y / A ( M , T , E ) and can be
described by a \E\ x \M\ matrix over T. A row of the matrix labelled by a key it,
defines the encoding function, ek, from M to T given by ek(s) = t if A(k, s) = t.
There are two types of attacks that will be considered, where in both types the
enemy is an intruder-in-the-middle. The attacks are:
• Impersonation Attack: The enemy introduces a message (s,t), where s G
M and t = ek(s), and hopes that this message is accepted as authentic by the
receiver.
• Substitution Attack: After observing an authentic message (s,t) in the
channel, the enemy constructs a message (s',f), s ^ s', and hopes that it is
accepted as authentic by the receiver.
The chance of an enemy's success in making the receiver accept his fraudulent message as authentic when he follows his optimal strategy in impersonation or substitution, is denoted by Pd0 and' Pdu respectively.
The assumption is that the authentication code, the two probability distributions
on M and E are publicly known but the actual value of the key, and so the encoding
function is not known.

4.2 Fail-Stop Signatures from A-codes
We are interested in families of A-codes. A family A = {A(MK, TK, EK) : K G N)
of A-codes is defined by a family of message spaces, Mt

a family of tag spaces,

T, and a family of key spaces S. Each of the three families is an infinite collection of sets indexed by K

G N.

K

: K

G N}

and S =

{EK

That is, M

= { M * : K G N], T - { T * :

G N}, and A(MK,TK,EK)

is an A-code with

P f > = m a x l P ^ , Pd[K)) < e where Pdg, Pd? are probability of success against
impersonation and substitution attack in A(MK,
TK,EK)For a function /, / : X -• X\ a collision is a pair *,*- 6 X such that /(«) /(*-). A function / from X to X' is called a collision intractable hash funcUon rf
finding a pair ^

such that f(x) = f(*) is hard. To make the hardness defindton

4 2. Fail-Stop Signatures from A-codes
-

DO

more precise, a family of functions indexed by a key K G iV is required. Then
intractability means that for all c > 0, there exists a K0 G N such that for all
K>

K0, and for all probabilistic polynomial time algorithms the chance of finding

collision is less than K~c.
A function h from X to X' is called a collision intractable bundling hash function
of degree 2 T , if it satisfies the following properties:
1. for every x' G X' which is the image of some x e X, that is x' = h(x), there
are at least 2 r preimages, x\, x2, • • • x2r, such that h(xi) = x', i = 1 • • • 2T.
2. It is hard to find a pair of elements x,x' <E X such that h(x) = h(x').
Again to make the second requirement more precise, a family of functions indexed
by a key K is required. There is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm gen(),
that on input k and r, both from N, generates an integer K G N. In this case
for each z = hK(X)

there are at least r preimages and the difficulty offindinga

collision under hK is at least A;. That is, for any polynomial QT that determines the
growth of r with k, and for all c > 0 there exists k0 such that for k > kQ the chance
offindingcollision is at least k~c.
This definition has similarities with the definition of bundling homomorphism
but is more general and does not require X and X' to have group structure.
N o w consider two families of A-codes A = {A(MK,TK,EK)

: K G N) and

A! = {A'(MK, T'K, E'K) : K G N } , a family of polynomial time collision intractable
bundling hash function U = {hK

: K G N} where hK : EK -> E'K, and a family

of polynomial time collision intractable hash functions W

= {h'K : K € N}, where

h'K:TK->rK.
The following property is required:
• Property I: for any choice of K, and for an arbitrary e G EK the following is
satisfied for all s G M # :
if

e(s) = t, and hK(e) = e', then e'(s) = t' and tiK(t) = t'

In other words, it is required to have the diagram shown in Figure 4.1 to satisfy
h'K(f(sK,eK)) = f'K(sK,hk(eK)),
Given a six tuple (A,A',S,S>,H,G)

VsK G MK,eK

G EK

an F S S can be constructed as follows.

The index K is the pre-key and is determined by a pre-key generation algorithm
gen(k, k', r) which takes the following parameters as input:

4.2. Fail-Stop Signatures from A-codes

* « *

'-

66
^

TK

«k
Me1*

i

Figure 4.1: General Construction of F S S from A-code
(i) r, the bundling degree of the hash function,
(ii) k the difficulty of finding collision for h, and
(iii) k' which is the difficulty of finding collision for h'.
The resulting index is the pre-key that determines various parameters of the system.
The signer must be sure that the K is a possible output of gen() by performing a
prekey verification algorithm.
Once K is determined, A(MK,TK,EK),

A'(MK,T'K,E'K),

hK and h'K are fixed

and we have the following stages.
1. Main key generation: the signer chooses e G E^ as his secret key (encoding
function) and constructs s' = hK(e) as his public key (verification function).
2. Signing: the signature for the message m G M^ is given by t = e(m).
3. Testing of the signature: a signature t on a message m is verified if h'K(t) =
e'(m).
4. Proof of forgery: given an acceptable signature tx on m where tx ^ e(m), the
signer produces t = e(m) as the proof of forgery.
Theorem 4.1 The above construction has the following properties:
1. Correct signatures pass the test.
2. A polynomially bounded signer cannot construct a signature and a valid proof
of forgery.
3. Iff is an acceptable signature on m' and t' * e(m>), the signer obtains a valid
proof of forgery.
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Proof: Part 1 follows immediately from the definition of A-codes, the two classes
of functions, and Property I. T o construct a signature and a proof of forgery, the
sender must find a message m with two signatures t and t' that both pass the test.
That isfindingt and t' such that h'K(t) - h'K(t') = e'(m) which because of collision
intractability of h'() is hard. A n alternative approach for the sender is to try to
find a key ex with hx(e) = hx(ex) and e\(m) ^ e(m) which is at least as hard as
finding collision for hK and is hard. Finally Part 3 is true because constructing
such signatures require finding collision for one of the two hash functions which is
n

assumed to be hard.
Theorem 4.2 Let k and o denote security parameters of the scheme described

above. Then for all pairs of secret and public keys, e, e', and given a message and
signature pair (m, t) where t = e(m), the probability of a signature t' on a message
m! that satisfies e'(m') = f also satisfies e(m) = t for an enemy with unlimited
power, is at most \V\/\W\ (V and W

defined below).

Proof: Suppose the enemy has a message (m, t) signed by the sender, and a signature
t' for a message m ' that passes the verification test. His chance of success in being
able to use (m',t') as a successful forgery is the same as the probability oft' being
the same as e(m') (that is the signature generated by the valid sender on m').
Knowing the public key e' allows the enemy to obtain a set E(e') of keys that
contains all the keys e such that hK(e) = hK(e), and includes the sender's key. Using
the knowledge of (m,t) the enemy can further reduce the set of possible keys for
the sender to W

= E(e', (m,t)) that contains the keys that m a p to ef and produce

the signature t on m . N o w enemy's best chance of success in constructing a forged
signature (m>,t>) that cannot be proven to be a forgery, is obtained by finding the
the following set:
V = m a x { e : e G E(e', (m,t)), e'(m') = h'(t'), e(m') = f}
m',t>

The success chance of an unbounded forger in constructing a forged signature is
given by |K|/|W|.

D

Using the above construction, constructing an FSS with security parameters
(a, k) requires choosing a to satisfy
\V\I\W\ < 2-'

4.3. A Construction
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A Construction

In the following an example construction for the above model is described. This
construction isfirstproposed in [129], and is described in Section 3.4. W e show that
the scheme can be regarded as an example of the general construction proposed in
this Chapter.
Let p and q denote two large primes, p < q, n = pq, and P = 2pq +1 where P
is also prime. Let g be an element of Zp of order p, ordP(g) = p. Define an A-code
as follows.

MeZn.
TeZn.
E = {eij = (i,j) : 0 < i < n - 1,0 < j < n - 1} where e„ : M
eij(l) = i+jl

->• T and

(modn).

Theorem 4.3 Let p < q < 2p. For the above A-code, Pd0 = ~ and Pdx = \.
Proof.
1. PdQ =

V

It is needed to show that for an arbitrary source state I, and an arbitrary tag
value t, the number of keys e{j such that e^if) = t is pq.
Such keys satisfy the following equation
i+jl = t

(mod pq)

Since there are pq choices for j and for each choice there is a unique i, then
pq keys will be obtained that satisfy the condition.

2. Pdx = J.
It is known that for an arbitrary source state I, a tag t, 0 < t < pq, occurs
exactly pq times. N o w , consider two source states I and I', and all the keys
that produce the tag t for the message I. That is: i + jZ = t. From these keys,
the number of keys (z, j) that produce the tag If for the message V is given by
A J_ ,7' - r' f' G Z«„. Or equivalently,
the number of solutions to the equation
i+jl-t,i**Pq
the number of solutions to,
t_t>=j(l-l>)

Consider two cases:

(mod pq)
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Case 1. gcd(l-l',pq) = 1.
Then, j = {l- l')-l(t -1')

(mod pq), and so there is a unique key with

this property.
Case 2. gcd(l-l',pq) ^ 1.

,

So, there can be either
i. I — I' = kp, k E Zq\0

(non-zero elements of Zq), or

ii. I — I' = kq, k £ Zp\0

(non-zero elements of Zp).

Each case is considered as follows:
i. Let I - I' = kp. Then, k = 1,2,- • • ,p,p+ 1, • • •, g — 1, and so
a. if k ^ p, then gcd(k,p) = 1. This means: (t - f) = jkp
(mod pq).

For a fixed t - t', the number of solutions (j) for

this equation is p. This is true because if jQ satisfies t -1' = j0kp
(mod pg), then (j0 + uq)

(mod pg) will also satisfy the equation.

This is:
t-t'

=

(jo + uq)kp

=

j0kp

(mod pq)

N o w , u can take p values, 0,1, • • • ,p - 1, and so there are. p
solutions. This means that a pair (t,f) will occur p times.
b. if k = p, (t - t') = jp 2

(mod pq). For afixed(t - t'), there are

also p solutions for this equation.
ii. Let l-V = kq, then k = 1,2, • • • , p - l , and hence
means: (t - t>) = jfcg

ffcd(M)

= 1- T h i s

(mod pg). For a fixed (t - t>), the number

of solutions for this equation is q. This is true because if Jo satisfies
t-t' = jQkq

(mod pq), then (jQ + up)

(mod pg) will also satisfy

the equation. N o w , u can take q values, 0,1, • • •, q - 1, and so there
are q solutions. This means that a pair (t,t) will occur q times.
Hence, the m a x i m u m number of solutions for t-t'=j(l-l')

(mod pq) is g

(since p < g). Therefore, the probability of success in substitution attack is:
\{eijleM(Q_ =

Pd

w

P D

^ = $$

t1ejj(Q^

K^SO^li
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Bundling Hash Function
Let Hp be the subgroup of Zp generated by g. Hence, \HP\ = p. The definition of
the mapping h : Zn ->• Hp is given by h(x) = #x

(mod P). In the following, it will

be shown that h is a bundling hash function.

1. For any x G Hp, there are q preimages in Zn; that is there are q such y s
that h(y) — x.
This is true because for all elements y' G Zn where y' = y + tp, and
te {0,1, ..«-l}:
h(y') = gy+tp = 9y = x
2. Given x G Hp it is difficult to find y such that h(y) = x.
This is true becausefindingy that satisfies gy = x

(mod P) is equivalent to

finding discrete logarithm in group Hp which is known to be hard (In fact, solving discrete logarithm in group Hp is considerably more difficult than factoring

n [85]).

3. Finding a pair x, x' G Hp such that h(x) = h(x') is as hard as factoring n.
This is true because h(x) = h(x') implies gx = gx> (mod P) and because g is
of order p, x = x' (mod p) and so x - x' is a multiple of p.

The above bundling hash function partitions Zn into p subsets each of size q
That is, Zn = V0 U Vx • • • U V^ where Vt•= » + tp, 0 < i < q - 1. From above, it is
known that an element x oftfpcorresponds to a unique VJ. Let Hp(i) denote x.
Now consider a family of A-codes, A'(M,T',E') where M
E' = /Tp x Hp and e'7J(/) = gY

= Zn , V = ^ P ,

where J = Hp(i) and J = Hp(j) respectively.

Theorem 4.4 In A'(M,T',E'), PdQ = J and Pdi = J.
Proo/.
1- ^o = \
For an arbitrary message / and an arbitrary tag value W

6

//the number of

keys e'„ for which «-„(«) = W is p. This is true because e„(J) - 9 S
(mod P ) where / = H„(i), J = H,U),

and

^ = H>'('")-
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That is the keys e'u(l) have to satisfy
i + jl = w (modp), i,j G ZP
This means that Pd0 = 2. To prove Pdx = J using a similar type of argument and for an arbitrary pair
of messages / and V, the following needs to be calculated

™$\{<r-W) = "><#') = *'}\
That is, the number of (i,j) that satisfy
i + jl = w (mod p) and i + jl' = w' (mod p)
or the number of js that satisfy
j(l — I') = w — w' (mod p)
This is .equal to 1 as j = (I - l')-l(w - w') (mod p). So for any chosen i
exactly one j can be found and so the number of (i,j) pairs is p which gives

Pdx = JD

4.4 An FSS scheme based on the above families
of A-codes
The following construction is based on A(M, T, E), A(M, T, E>), the bundling hash
function defined above and assuming h' to be defined as h'(x) = h(x), x G Z*. That
is taking the hash function h! to be equal to the same as the bundling hash function
h on all its inputs. It is noted that the above choices for the A-codes, h and hi will
satisfy Property I. This is true because for any choice of K and for an arbitrary
e = (i,j),ij G Zn, andm

= le Zn, it implies t = e(m) = i + jl (mod n). The

bundling hash function hK is defined by 9, an element of order p, in Z*n. That is
e' = h(i, j) = (p*. ^ ) and e'(/) = ^ V = 9i+jl = W)

(mod P ) '

The A-codes are public and we follow the second model of FSS (as in [138]) with
no trusted dealer. This scheme can be easily modified to the first model of FSS (as
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in [137, 45]) by replacing the role of 71 with a trusted dealer in the prekey generation
phase.
This scheme is a special case of the scheme proposed in Section 3.4 where in
P = tpq+l,t

= 2. A s noted in Section 7.2, constructing an FSS that can only

be described as an instance of the A-code construction and not an instance of the
general construction in [98] is an open problem.

• Prekey Generation:
TI chooses two prime numbers p and q, p < q, and computes n = pq and
P = 2pg + 1. P must also be a prime. If P is not a prime, 71 has to choose
another set of p and g. H e also chooses an element g of Zp with ordP(g) = p.
Finally, he publishes n, g and P, and keeps p and g secret.
• Key Generation:
S chooses a secret key (i,j), and publishes his public key (71,72), where
7l

= gi (mod P)

72 = g* (mod P)
• Signing A Message;
To sign a message £ G Zn, S computes
t = i + j£ (mod n)
where * denotes the signature or the tag of £. The signed message is (£,t).
• Testing A Signature:
(£, t) passes the verification test if
7i72 - 9* (mod p)
holds.
• Proof of Forgery:
If there is a forged signature t' that also passes the verification test, the presumed signer can prove that he has obtained a collision by showing his own
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signature t together with t'. That is,

9l = / (modP)
t =
t-t' =

t' (mod p)
kp, keZ

'

Then, the presumed signer canfindthe factorisation of n by calculating
gcd(t -1', n)
which is p.
Security Proof

Theorem 4.5 Under DL and factorisation assumptions, the construction descr
above is secure for the receiver and signer.

Proof: The above construction conforms with the general construction descr
Section 4.2 and so using theorem 4.3 provides security for the receiver. The level of
security for the sender is obtained byfinding\W\ and |V|.
Let the public key be e' labelled by (/, J) where / = Hp(i) and J = Hp(j); that
is e'(l) = g(l+Jiy Firstly it is noted that |E(e')| = q2. This is because the encoding
rule labelled by ((i + mp), (j + np)), where m, n G {0,1, • • • q -1} are mapped to the
same e'. Next For an arbitrary t G T and a message I G M, it is required to find
E(e',(l,t)) = \{e€E(e'):e(l)=t}\
That is find the number of solutions to
(i + mp) + (j + np)l = t (mod pg)
where i + jl = t' (mod pg) or equivalently,findingthe number of solutions to
(m + nl)p = t-t' (mod pg), or the number of solution to m + nl = t-1' (mod g).
Now for any / and an arbitrary n a unique m that satisfies this equation can be found.
So \W\ = |E(e', (/, t))\ = \{e G E(e') : e(l) = t}\ = g.
TofindV, a message I' with tag if satisfying h'(t') = e^(Z') is considered. This
means that one has gd+^+d+"*>»' = /

(mod P), or (t + mp) + (j + np)l' = t'.

Combining this equation with the one obtained from e(m) = t, and
i+jl = w

assuming

(mod pg) and i + jl' = uf (mod pg), one obtains two equations:
m + nl = t-w

(modg) and

m + nl' = t'-w

(mod g)
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That is, n(l - V) = (u - „') + (w - w>)

( m o d q)f which

h

a

|V| = 1 and |V|/|W| = 1/q.
From the above theorem it is required to choose 1/p < 2~° orp = log2 a and p <
D

I

4.5 Construction of FSS from linear A-codes
In this section, a new class of A-codes will be used, called linear A-codes, and a
construction of F S S schemes by using linear A-codes and a one-way functions L
based on discrete logarithm will be presented. It will be shown in the next Chapter
that the resulting construction has better performance than all previously known
schemes.
In the rest of this Chapter, let p be a prime and Tp be thefinitefieldof order p
(Tp m a y be regarded as Zp). Let V(n,q) denote an n-dimension vector space over
afinitefieldwith order q.
Let ( M , T^ E ) be an authentication code with an authentication

mapping

/ : M x E — > T. To each source state s G M , we associate a mapping fs from E to
T and defined by fs(e) = /(s,e),Ve G E . Then the family {/, | s G S) completely
characterises the underlying A-code ( M , T , E ) . W e require that the functions fs
have some additional properties, defined as follows.
Definition 4.1 An A-code ( M , T, E ) with an authentication mapping

/ :M xE—^T
is called linear (over Tp) if
1. Both E and T are linear space over Tp;
2. For each s GM, fs is Tp-linear from E to T.
Assume that E and T are w-dimensional and v-dimensional vector spaces, respectively, then for the fixed basis of E and T each linear mapping from E to T can be
represented asauxv

matrix oyer Tp. Let the source space S be identified with a

subset of u by v matrices over Tq.
In the sequel, it is assumed that ( M , T , E ) with authentication mapping / is
a linear A-code with E = V(u,p), T = V(v,p), where p is a prime. It is also
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is a subset of u by v matrices over Tp, and /, can be identified as

fs(e) = es = t, where e G V(u,p), t G V(v,p).
The construction of the F S S scheme is by combining the linear A-code and the
one-way function of discrete logarithm fp,g(x). It works as follows.
• Prekey Generation:
The centre selects primes g and p such that g|p - 1, and a cyclic subgroup Hp
of T*q with order p such that the discrete logarithm over Hp is hard. He also
chooses two elements g,h G Hp, and publishes (p, g, g, h).
• Key Generation:
The signer chooses a secret key sk which consists of two authentication keys
of a linear A-code ( M , T , E ) over Tp, that is, sk = (e,e'),e,e' G E , where
e = [d,..., e u ], e' = [e^ ..., e'u],\/e{, e) G Tq. The corresponding public key pk
is ge 0 he' defined as
g*Qh<

=

[ge>he'i,...,ge"h<] (modg)

=

\pkx, • • • ,pku}.

• Signing A Message:
To sign a message s G M , the signer applies the authentication code (M, T, E )
to generate two authentication tags t and t' corresponding to the key e and e'.
That is, the signed message is,
(s,f(s,e),f(s,e')) =

(s,es,e's) (modp)

= (M,0
=

(s,[tx,...,tv},[t'v...,t'v])

• Verifying A Signature:
For a message
/ Si,i
S2,X
S

Sx,2
S

S

• • •

2,2

' ' '

SUj2

'''

hv

S

2,v

=

\

Su,l

Su

'w /

(s,t,f) is an acceptable signed message iff for all 1 < % < v,
gi<h^ = (pkxr'i(pk2)s2'i-'-(pku)Su-i (mod^-
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• Proof of Forgery:
If there is a forged signature (i, i') on a message s, then the presumed signer
can produce his o w n signature on the same message, namely (t,f), and show
that these two signatures collide.

/

Definition 4.2 A linear A-code (M,T,E) is e-secure ifm&x{Pd0,Pdx} < e.
Theorem 4.6 Let o be a parameter that shows the difficulty of solving the underlying discrete logarithm problem by a polynomially bounded forger. If the linear
A-code ( M , T , E ) is e-secure, then the above construction results in a (k,a)-secure
FSS scheme, where a — log(l/e).
Proof: Clearly, if both the signer and the recipient follow the protocol, then every
signature generated by the signer will pass the test by the recipient. It is left to
show that the scheme is (k, cr)-secure. First, assume that an unbounded forger tries
to generate a signature that passes the test with respect to the public key such that
the signer cannot provide a proof of forgery, it m a y be further assumed that the
forger can solve the underlying discrete logarithm. It follows that the forger can
calculate a = logg h G Tp and e + ae' = [ex + ae[,...,eu + aE'u]. Since the forger
does not k n o w the authentication keys e and e', the success probability of such a
forgery is

Pforyery

\{(e,e')e£2\es = t,e's = t'}\
max m|X ^
^ ^ ^ ^^ & + ^ ^ fl||

-

=

\{eeS\es = t}\
\{ee£}\
Pdo

<

c

In fact, the value of \V\ and \W\ have been calculated as in the general construction
given earlier.
Next, it is shown that with knowing two different signatures on a message that
pass the test, anyone can solve the underlying logarithm problem (that is to find
a = logfl h or a- 1 = log/l g). Indeed, assume that (t, if) = ([tx, • • •, *«]> [<i> • • • > Q)
(t, i>) = ([tx, ...,tv], [i'x,..., i'v\) are two valid signatures (w.r.t the public key) for a
c o m m o n message s. Since (*, t>) ± ft i>), it m a y be assumed that there exists i such
that t[ ? h (or alternatively, it m a y be assumed that there is j such that tj ? t'j),

and
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so t[ - h ± 0 m o d p . O n the other hand, since both (t,t>) and (i,~f) pass the test
with respect to the c o m m o n public key [pkx,.. .,pku], the following is obtained:
gW = glih^ = (pkx)s^ • • • (pku)s^ mod p.
It follows that /i(*i"*'*) = gib-*) mod q, and so g^^-^'i) _ g(u-ti)

modp There_

fore a = \oggh = (tj - £'*)(£ - tj)"1 m o d p . From this, it is concluded that (1)
the scheme is secure against a polynomially bounded signer, that is, a signer cannot
construct a signature and later provide a proof of forgery, and (2) if there is a forged
signature (i, i') on a message s, then the presumed signer can produce his own signature on the same message, namely (t, t'), and show that these two signatures collide.
Hence, the value log5 h is revealed.
Example 4.1 Let M = T = Fp and E = Tp x Tp. A function / : M x E —• T
is defined by f(s, (ex,e2)) = ex + se2 Then it is easy to verify that ( M , T,E) with
authentication function given by f is a linear A-code over Tp. In terms of matrix
representation, the source S can be identified as a set of 2 x 1 matrices over V(p, 1)

S = {s =

| w G Tp),

and the authentication mapping f by f(s, (ex, e2)) = (ei, e2) [

) — ei + we2. The

FSS based on this linear A-code is the same with vHP scheme [137].

4.6

A Construction of Linear A-codes

Although the underlying linear A-code of the construction in example 4.1 is nearly
optimal (that is nearly meets the square root bound), it requires that the size of key
is double the size of the source, that is, log |E| = 21og|M|, which shows that the
size of the key linearly grows with the size of the source. In the following, new linear
A-codes such that the source is m u c h larger than the keys will be constructed.
A polynomial of the form
L(x) = Y/aixp'
i=o

with coefficients in an extensionfieldJ > of J> is called a p-polynomial over J > .
If the value of p is fixed once or is clear from the context, it is also called a hnear
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polynomial. It is well-known that if T is an arbitrary extension field of Tpm and
L(x) is a linearised polynomial over Tpm, then
L[p + 7) = L(P) + L(7) for all /?, 7 G T,
l
L(c/3) = cL(p) for all c e Tp and all /3 G J".
Thus, if JF is considered as a vector space over Tp, then the linearised polynomial
L(x) induces a linear operator on T.
Next a linear A-code is constructed from linearised polynomial. W e note that
linearised polynomials have been also used to construct authentication codes for
non-trusting parties [67, 66] and message authentication codes for multiple authentication [116]. Let p be a prime and assume,
• M = \Ls(x) = Y,i=o o-iXpl | Oj G Fpr), that is, each source state s G M
correspond to a certain linearised polynomial over Tpr, denoted by Ls(x).
W e use linearised polynomials up to degree pfc_1 resulting in (pT)k different
polynomials and so |M| = prk.
• E = {(ei, e2) | ex, e2 G Tpr), and so |E| = p2r.
• T = Tpr.
• The authentication mapping / : M x E —• T is defined by
/(Ls(x),(ei,e2)) = e1 + Ls(e2)

Theorem 4.7 The above construction results in a linear A-code (M, E, T) ove
with the following parameters
|M|=pr*, |E|=p2r, |T|=pr
and
Pd0 =

p-r,Pdx=P-{r-k+l)-

Combining Theorem 4.6 and 4.7, the following corollary is obtained.

Corollary 4.8 Let p be a prime and let k denote the security level of the u

discrete logarithm against a polynomially bounded forger. Then the above line
code results in a (k,a)-secure FSS scheme where a = (r - k + l)|p|2-

4.7.

4.7

Summary

Summary

In this Chapter, a general construction of FSS schemes using authentication codes is
proposed and it is shown that a previously proposed FSSfitsinto this construction.
It is likely that other known schemes that are based on {he general construction
in [98] can be also explained through the A-code construction. However, it is not
known if the two constructions are equivalent. W e gave, the construction of an FSS
scheme from linear authentication codes that outperforms all previously known FSS
schemes with respect to the redundancy rate. A general comparison of FSS schemes
will be given in the next Chapter.

*

Chapter 5
Efficiency Comparison of FSS Schemes
In this Chapter, a comparison of all the F S S constructions mentioned in this thesis
will be discussed. A first comparison will be m a d e based on the three parameter
lengths (as suggested in [98]) namely the length of the secret key, the public key and
the signature. A second comparison is based on redundancy rate [129]. Finally we
compare the cost of signing long messages.
It was generally believed that the most efficient F S S scheme was the v H P scheme
[137]. This scheme was also believed to be very efficient when it is used for signing
long messages* using hash-then-sign method. However this method requires a hash
function with provable security [36, 44]. Such hash functions require approximately
one multiplication per message bit and the length of the output is the length of the
modulus used in the hash function (page 312 [98]). This means that the signature
generation is a costly process.
Part of this Chapter appeared in the Proceedings of The Fourth Australasian
Conference on Security and Privacy, ACISP
national Workshop

on Security, IWSEC

International Workshop

'99 [130], the Proceedings of Inter-

'99 [131], the Proceedings of The Third

on Information Security - ISW 2000 [117], the Proceedings

of The First International Conference on Cryptology in India, Indocrypt 2000 [119]
and The Computer Journal [129].

5.1 Introduction
Efficiency and optimally of F S S schemes has been studied originally in [98]. Based
on this work, an efficiency of an F S S system is based on the three length parameters,
namely the length of the secret key, the public key and the signature.
In this Chapter, w e use two other criteria as follows.
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• Efficiency with respect to the message-length (redundancy rate). This type of
efficiency measurement is first proposed in [129].
• Efficiency of FSS schemes to sign long messages. This type of efficiency measurement is first proposed in [119], following the idea'of [98]).
We compare six FSS schemes namely:
Scheme 1. vHP Scheme (proposed in [137] and described in section 2.5.1).
Scheme 2. HPP Factorisation Scheme (proposed in [138] and described in section 2.5.3).
Scheme 3. FSS based on RSA (proposed in [131] and described in section 3.2).
Scheme 4. FSS based on Factorisation and Discrete Logarithm modulo Composite Numbers (proposed in [117] and described in section 3.3).
Scheme 5. FSS based on Factorisation and Discrete Logarithm (proposed in [129] and
described in section 3.4).
Scheme 6. FSS based on Linear Authentication Codes (proposed in [119] and described
in section 4.5).

5.2 Efficiency with respect to the three length parameters
To compare efficiency of FSSs, the level of security provided by the schemes must
be fixed and the size of the three length parameters together with the number of
operations (for example multiplication) required for signing and testing need to be
calculated.
Table 5.1 gives the resnlts of comparison of six F S S schemes when the secunty
levels of the receiver and the sender are given by k and a, respectively. In the
comparison, the same value of a and * for all the systems are nsed, and the size
of the three length parameters are determined. The underlying hard problem m
the schemes are Discrete Logarithm (DL), Subgroup D L [85] and/or Factonsatrom
This means the same level of receiver's security (given by the value of paramete *,
translates into different size primes and moduli. In particular, the secnnty level
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a 151 bits subgroup discrete logarithm with basic primes of at least 1881 bits, is the
same as factorisation of a 1881 bits R S A modulus [85].
1. vHP

Scheme

To find the size of primes in v H P scheme, assuming securjty parameters (k, a) are
given,firstK = max(A;, o) is found and then the prime q is chosen such that |g|2 > K.
The bundling degree in this scheme is q and the value of p is chosen such that q\p-1
and (p - l)/q is upper-bounded by a polynomial in K (page 237 and 238 [103]).
|p|2 must be chosen according to standard discrete logarithm problem, which for
adequate security must be at least 1881 bits [85]. However, \q\2 can be chosen as
low as 151 bits [85]. Since \p\2 and \q\2 are to some extent independent, K is used
to denote |p|22. HPP Factorisation Scheme
In the factorisation scheme of [98], the security level of the sender, a satisfies r =
p+a where r is the bundling degree and 2P is the size of the message space. Security
parameter of the receiver, k, is determined by the difficulty of factoring the modulus
n. N o w for a. given pair of security parameters, (k,a), the size of the modulus Nk
is determined by k but determining r requires knowledge of the size of the message
space. Assume p = \p\2 « \q\2 = Nk/2. This means that r = a + Nk/2. N o w the
efficiency parameters of the system can be given as shown in the table. In particular
the size of the secret and the public keys are 2(r + Nk) and 2Nk, respectively.
3. FSS Based on RSA
In RSA-based F S S scheme [131], r = \<f>(n)\2, and the security of the receiver is
determined by the difficulty of factoring n. This means that r « \n\2. To design
a system with security parameters (k,a),firstNk, the modulus size that provides
security level k for the receiver, is determined and then K = max(a,\Nk\2).
modulus n is chosen such that \n\2 = K.

The

With this choice, the system provides

adequate security for the sender and the receiver.
4. FSS Based on Factorisation and DL modulo Composite Number
In F S S based on factorisation and D L modulo composite number, the bundling
degree and hence the security level of the sender is a = r = |/|2- The security o
the receiver is determined by the difficulty of factorisation of n and subgroup D
of size / in Z*n. Assume that \p\2 « k|2 « *

and \n\2 « c x |/|, Then, given

the security parameter (*,„), Nk, which is the modulus size for which the hardness
of factorisation is *, must be found. Next, Fk,Nk, which is the minimum size
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multiplicative subgroup of Z*n for which subgroup discrete logarithm has hardness
k [85], must be found. Finally, K = max(Fk,Nk,a) is chosen, and |/|2 = K is set.
With these choices, the sender and receiver's level of security is at least o and k,
respectively. Let K denote \n\2.
5. FSS Based on Factorisation and DL
In the F S S based on factorisation and D L , the bundling degree and hence security
level of the sender is \q\2. T h e security of the receiver is determined by the difficulty
of D L in Z*P and factorisation of n. Assume \p\2 « \q\2 « ^ . Then,firstlyNk,
which is the modulus size for which factorisation has difficulty k, must be found. N o w
since P >n, D L in Zp will have difficulty A; [85] and one chooses K = max(^-,(j),
\q\2 — K « \p\2 and P > n. With these choices the sender and receiver level of
security is at least a and k, respectively. For example for (k,a) = (151,151), firstly
jV15i = 1881 [85] is found and K = m a x (1881/2,151) = 941 is chosen, which results
in |p|2 « |g|2 « 941 and |n|2 « |P|2 « 1882. Since |P|2 can be chosen much greater
than \n\2, Kis used to denote |P|2, and so when |P|2 « |n|2, K « 2/f is obtained.
5. PSS 1 Based on Linear A-codes
In this scheme, given the security parameter (A;,a),firstK = max(k;a) is chosen,
and then the prime q is also chosen such that \q\2 > K. Let K denote \p\2. In the
comparison table, it is also given the case when r = k = 1.
The result of comparison is given in Table 5.1.
From Table 5.1, it can be concluded that,
. T h e most efficient scheme is v H P scheme, with K > 151. bits and K > 1881
bits [85].
. T h e F S S based on Factorisation and D L [129] has nearly the same performance
as v H P scheme. However, because of the subgroup D L problem, K in v H P
scheme can be as low as 151 bits, while in this scheme it must be at least 940
bits. This scheme outperforms the factorisation scheme of [138, 98]. In fact,
this scheme is the only scheme that requires only 1 multiplication on signing
a message.
. T h e F S S based on Factorisation and S D L [117] has the same efficiency level
as those of v H P scheme. In v H P scheme, to achieve the adequate secunty K
must be chosen to be at least 151 bits, and K must be at least 1881 brts [85],
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These are also the values required by this scheme. This scheme outperforms
the factorisation scheme of [98].
In this scheme, to assure the security of the scheme (as noted in the construction in section 3.3), |/|2 must be chosen tv 151 bits, for |n|2 « 1881 bits

[85].
• As has been pointed out in the previous Chapter, when r = jfe = 1, the FSS
based on Linear A-codes [119] coincides with v H P scheme.

5.3 Efficiency with respect to the message-length
If the length of the signature and the message are denoted by \y\2 and \x\2 respectively, p = |y|2/|a:|2.is a measure of communication efficiency of the scheme.
For example p = 1 means that to authenticate one bit information, one bit extra
(signature) must be sent over the channel. This is also known as redundancy rate.
In F S S based on factorisation and D L , messages and signatures are both from Zn
and so p = 1. In v H P scheme messages belong to a subgroup of size g-and signature
are of size 2|g|2. This means that p = 2 and so for every bit authenticated message
2 bits signature must be sent and so this signature scheme is more efficient in this
regard. However, in practice the signatures are on hash values of an arbitrary length
message and are at most 256 bits. N o w because in v H P scheme \x\2 < 151 while
in this scheme |rr|2 < 1881, the rigidity of this scheme effectively reduces the gain
resulted from the better communication efficiency. In the factorisation scheme [98],
messages are p bits, and signatures are k + p + o bits. Assuming that k = p, then
p > 2. In the R S A based F S S in [131], messages belong to Z* and signature are of
size 4|n|2. This means that p = 4.
In F S S based on factorisation and S D L , messages are from Zf, and signatures
are from Z). That means p = 2. In F S S based on Linear A-codes, the message size
is r2|p|2, and the signature size is 2r\p\2. Therefore, p = 2/r.
The result of this comparison is given in Table 5.2.
From Table 5.2, it can be concluded that,
. F S S based on factorisation and D L outperforms v H P scheme.
. B y choosing r = 2, F S S based on Linear A-codes outperforms v H P scheme,
and it performs as efficient as F S S based on factorisation and D L (with p - 1).
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B y letting r > 2, F S S based on Linear A-codes outperforms all the existing
FSS schemes.

5.4

Efficiency Comparison of FSS schemes for Sign-

ing Long Messages
A commonly used method of signing an arbitrary long message using a traditional
signature scheme is by employing hash-then-sign method. Using this method, the
message isfirsthashed and then the signature scheme is applied to the hash value.
In F S S a similar method can be used [98]. However, as noted in [98] the proof
of forgery will not be based on showing that the underlying assumption of the
signature scheme is broken but rather it will be by showing that a collision for the
collision-resistant hash function used for hashing is found. This implies that to have
an acceptable proof of forgery, a hash function which is based on a computational
assumption must be used. In [36, 44] hash functions based on discrete logarithm
and factorisation assumption are constructed and it is shown that they require on
average one multiplication for each bit of the message and the size of the hash value
is equal to the size of the modulus. This means that for long messages FSS schemes
have a slow signature generation process (for example one million multiplications
for a one m e g a byte file). A n alternative approach is to have an FSS scheme that
can be directly used for arbitrary long messages.
In this section, a comparison between these two approach will be described. The
first method is by employing a v H P F S S scheme (this can be replaced by any other
'traditional' F S S schemes) together with a provably secure hash function proposed
in [36, 44]. T h e hash function requires on average one multiplication for each bit of
the message, and the size of the hash value is equal to the size of the modulus. The
second method is by using a specially designed FSS scheme for long messages, that
is the F S S scheme based on Linear A-codes described in section 4.5.
In the comparison, it is assumed that the length of the message is r x kK bits
for some integers r and k such that r > k and K = \qW Let K - W

T h e resu i

of the comparison is shown in Table 5.3.
The table shows that signing using this construction is K/2 times faster while
verification is approximately rk/2 times slower. For example, to achreve adequa e
security [85], K = 151 bits and k = 1881 bits [85] are chosen. Also to sunphfy the
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comparison, it is assumed that r = k. To sign a 1 Mega byte message using hashthen sign approach (i.e. using v H P scheme with a secure hash function proposed in
[44]), the number of multiplications required for signing and testing are 1,065,458
and 302, respectively. However, by using the proposed approach, the number of
multiplications required for signing and testing are 14,112 and 1,090,824, respectively. This asymmetry between the amount of computation required for signing
and verification is useful in applications where signer has limited computing power,
for example uses a smart card, and the verifier has a powerful server, for example is
a bank.

5.5 Summary
In this Chapter, we compared various FSS schemes. We showed that vHP scheme
is an efficient scheme which respects to thefirstthree parameters of the FSS. With
respect to the message length, the F S S scheme based on factorisation and D L and the
FSS scheme based on Linear A-codes outperform the v H P scheme. More specifically,
the v H P scheme is not efficient for signing long messages, due to the cost of the
hash function. Moreover, the proof of forgery for long messages is different from the
traditional v H P scheme and is based on the collision of the hash function.
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Hash-then-sign approach

Our Scheme

Sign (number of multiplications)
Test (number qf multiplications)
Length of Secret Key

« rkK + 2
<2K
4K

2rk

Length of Public Key
Length of Signature
Underlying Security
Assumption

2K
2K
Collision-Resistant
Hash Function & D L

<(2 + k)rK
AkK

2rK
2rK
DL

Table 5.3: Complexity of the two FSS approaches for signing long messages

Chapter 6
Distributed FSS Schemes
Threshold cryptography, and in particular threshold signature, replaces a single
system entity in a classical cryptosystem with a group of entities sharing the same
power. A threshold cryptosystem must remain secure not only under the attacks on
the original cryptosystem, but also new types of attacks that are introduced because
of the distributed structure of the system. In this Chapter, a distributed version
of FSS schemes will be described. A s in the threshold cryptography, the original
signer in F S S will be replaced by a group of entities, which are required to collaborate
during the F S S signature generation phase. A s in the signature generation phase,
the proof of forgery will also work in the same manner. A group of entities need to
collaborate to provide a proof of forgery.
In the realisation of distributed F S S schemes, an additional issue needs to be
considered. A s noted earlier, the proof of forgery requires collaboration of a group
of members. A problem will arise if some group members are dishonest and will
attempt to stop the honest m e m b e r s to provide a valid proof of forgery. Therefore,
a distributed F S S scheme must have cheater detection property so that a junk sent by
a malicious user can be detected. Another issue is how to collect enough members
of the group so that the proof of forgery can be provided. These issues will be
addressed in this Chapter.
The Chapter will be started by a simple (n,n) threshold FSS schemes, fol owed
by a (,, „) threshold F S S schemes, either with the assistance of a trusted authonty
or not. For eaeh scheme, a traditional F S S will be used as a basis of the d e b u t e d
version. However, the method can be applied to any other FSS schemes.

Part of this Chapter appeared in the Proceed^ *
Security and Privacy, ACISP

«

£

%

%

£

'99 [130], the Proceeding* of The Th,rd In

Workshop on Information Security - ISW

2000 [117] and the

Proceed^'<*

First International Conference on Cryptology in India, Indocrypt 2000 [119].
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Introduction

Threshold cryptography, and in particular threshold signature, was independently
invented by Desmedt [48], Boyd [18], Croft and Harris [42]. T h e main goal of
threshold cryptography is to replace a system entity - sucn as a transmitter - in a
classical cryptosystem with a group of entities sharing the same power. A threshold cryptosystem must remain secure not only under the attacks on the original
cryptosystem, but also n e w types of attacks that are introduced because of the
distributed structure of the system.
In a (t,n) threshold signature scheme [50], signature generation requires collaboration of at least t m e m b e r s of a set of n signers. Although the construction of
threshold signature schemes generally uses a combination of secret sharing schemes
and signature schemes, as noted in [49], a simplistic combination of the two primitives could result in a completely insecure systems that allows the members of
an authorised group to recover the secret key of the signature scheme. In a secure
threshold signature scheme the power of signature generation must be shared among
n signers in such a w a y that t signers can collaborate to produce a valid signature for
any given message whilst no subset of fewer than t participants can forge a signature.
Similarly, an F S S scheme is called a (t, n) threshold FSS scheme if the role of the
signer in an F S S scheme is replaced by n polynomially bounded signers in such a way
that key generation, signature generation and proof of forgery require collaboration
of at least t signers.
Firstly, an efficient (n, n) threshold F S S scheme will be discussed. The construction will be based on the F S S obtained from Linear A-codes (section 4.5). However,
this method can be applied to any other FSS schemes.

6.2 (n,n) Threshold FSS Schemes
In this section, a (n, n) threshold FSS scheme will be constructed. The construction
is based on the F S S based on Linear A-codes, mentioned in section 4.5. However,
the approach can be applied to any other FSS scheme.
Z
• P„c
S Again it is assumed that ( M , T , E ) with authenThere are n signers bx, • • •, < V Again m o «
tieation mapping / is a linear A-code. The scheme works as follows.
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• Prekey Generation:
The centre selects primes p and q such that q\p - 1 and a cyclic subgroup Hq
of Fp with order q such that the discrete logarithm over Hq is hard. He also
chooses two elements g,he Hq, and publishes (p,q,y,h).
• Key Co-Generation:
Each signer Si chooses a secret key sk(i) which consist of two authentication
keys of a linear A-code ( M , T , E ) over Tv, that is,
sk(i) = (e(i),e'(i)),e(i),e'(i) GE
where e(i) = [ex(i),..., eu(i)], e'(i) = [e\(i),... ^^(i^e^i),^^) Gfp. Then
Si broadcasts to the other signers
ge(i)Qhe'(i)

_

[5ei(0/le'i(0>...j5e«(0/!<(*)] (mod?)

= [ph(i),...,pku(i)].
The group public key is
k

k

pk = [Jlpkl(i),...,]lpku(i)].
i=l

i=l

• Co-Sign:
To sign a message m

€ M , each signer S{ applies the authentication code

( M , T , E ) to generate two authentication tags t(i) and t'(i) corresponding to
the key e(i) and e'(i). That is, the (partial) signature for a message m of S is
(s,f(s,e(i)),f(s,e'(i))) = (s,e(i)s,e'(i)s) (modp)
=
=

(s,t(j),t'(i))
(s>[t1(0,...,*„(0L[*i(0, •••.<;(•)])

The signer then broadcasts (s,t(i),t'(i)) to other users. The final signature
for the group is

(t,f)=an'i(o.-.n«.w].in'iw.-.n<iw]) (modp>i=i

i=i

i=1

I_1

• Test:
This is exactly the same as the construction in Section 4.5 for the single case.
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• Proof of Forgery:
This is exactly the same as the construction in Section 4.5 for the single case.
Theorem 6.1 Under the assumption that the discrete logarithm is intractable the
above scheme is (n, n) threshold FSS scheme.
Proof: Completeness and soundness directly follow from the description of the
scheme.
It is left to prove that any up to n - 1 signers cannot generate a valid signature.
The proof of security is by using a simulation argument for the view of the adversary
and showing that an adversary w h o has access to all the key information of the
corrupted signers and the signature on m could generate, by itself, all the other
public information produced by the protocol. Without loss of generality, assume
that an adversary £ w h o has corrupted thefirstn - l signers Si,... ,<Sn-i and has
learned their secrets. A simulator SIMU
to the simulator SIMU

is constructed for the scheme. The input

is the message s and its signature (s, (t,t')). However, the

secret information held by Sk is never exposed and is not simulated.
The SIMU

works as follows.

1. Key Co-Generation
• Choose (e(l), e'(l)),... (e(k - 1), e'(k - 1)) eR £ x £, where
e(i) = [ei(z),...,eu(i)U(i) = K(0- • • ,*«(01, ^(0,3(0 e^'V1 *

l

^ *~1;

• Compute the 'broadcast' key of Si, VI < i < k - 1:

^)0/,?W

=

[^w^w,...,/ u(i) ^ (i) ]

= [pki(i),..-,p\(^]• Set
gm 0 hi'(k)={ftpki(i)i

n P*I(O, • • •, np*«w/ n>»M-

u c fr,r nil 1 < i < k — 1, holds

At the end the simulation in this phase, each Si, for all _
.
a 'simulation- version of the execution of the protocol of Key Co-Generafo„.
T h e notation a is used in the simulation corresponding to a in the executmn
of the protocol.

6.2. (n, n) Threshold FSS Schemes
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2. Co-Sign:
• Compute the partial signatures

(s, i(i), i'(i)) = (s, f(s, e(i)), f(s, ~e'(i))) = (s, [ix(i),..., t^)], [t[(i),..., i'
for all 1 < i < k - 1.
• Set

~m = ([nti(o/n^(o,...,n^(o/n*«(o],
i=X

i=l

i=l

i=l

~t\k) = [nti(i)/nV1(o,...,n^(o/n1?,(o])i=X

i=l

i=l

i=l

It is straightforward to verify that the view of the adversary £ on execution of the
protocol, and its view on execution of SIMU

are statistically indistinguishable, and

the result follows.
In the above (n, n) scheme, the size of each signer's key, the size of the public
key and the length of the signature are exactly the same as the single signer scheme
and so is very efficient.

6.2.1 Extensions
Proof of forgery
In the above scheme, if a forged message is found, collaboration of all the signers are
required to prove that the forgery has occurred. That is each signer must submit
his partial signature and the correct signature of the signers on the message must
be constructed. B y showing two different signatures that pass the verification test,
the signers can prove that a forgery has happened. This means that all the signers
must honestly participate in proving forgery and if only one of them does not submit
his correct partial signature the forgery cannot be proved. A n open question is to
design systems in which the forgery can be proved if some of the users do not ah
part in the proof of forgery. T h e best case is when a single honest signer can prov.de
proof of forgery.
(t, n) S c h e m e s
collaboration of t out of n
A natural extension of n, n) schemes are (t, n) where

ft3. M

Threshold F S S Schemes with the Assistance of A Trusted Dealer
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forgery if a forged signature is found. It is possible to extend the above (n, n) scheme
to (t,n) scheme using cumulative arrays [65] to distribute the key information.
Another possibility is to follow the standard approach in threshold cryptography.
That is, to convert an F S S scheme to a (t, n) FSS by splitting the secret key of the
FSS scheme to n signers using a (t, n) secret sharing scheme.

6.3 (t,n) Threshold FSS Schemes with the Assistance of A Trusted Dealer
In this section, a (t,n) threshold FSS schemes will be constructed. This is the
simplest (t, n) threshold F S S construction, which involves a trusted dealer in the
key generation phase. T h e presented scheme is based on the FSS schemes based
on Elliptic Curves mentioned in section 3.1.1. The approach can be applied to any
other FSS schemes.

6.3.1 Model
The proposed model follows the construction as in [137, 45]. There is a group of
n senders, S - SX,S2, • • • ,Sn, a group coordinator <S, and a combiner C, who is
only trusted in combining partial signatures, and a centre TA that is trusted by all
the recipients. Neither TA

nor S are involved in signature generation. In case of

dispute, senders can provide a proof of forgery by solving the E C D L problem.

6.3.2 Signature Scheme
• Prekey Generation:
Prekey Generation consists of two steps,
1. System Setup
2. Group Coordinator's Setup
System Setup:
1. TA

chooses an elliptic curve £ „ M

prime.

such that „ = #Er(a,b) is also

6.3. (t,n) Threshold FSS Schemes with the Assistance of A Trusted Dealer
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2. TA randomly chooses a point a e Ep(a,b), and a number d e Tq. He
calculates /3 = da over Ep(a,b) and discards d. Finally, he publishes
(Ep(a,b),q,a,(3).
Group Coordinator's Setup:
S does the following.
1. Verify whether (a,/3) is correctly located in Ep(a,b). If not reject the
public parameters.
2. Randomly choose 4 non-zero elements of Tq, kx,k2,kz,k4, ki G Tq, and
compute
ai

= k3a + kx /3 over Ep(a, b)

a2 = ha + k2 /3 over Ep(a, b)
Publish (ax,a2).
3. Randomly choose n non-zero elements of Tq, h,h,- • • Jn, and publish
them as identities of <Si, • • • o n .
4. Randomly choose 4(t -;1) elements of Tq, ai.i, ai,2, ai,3, ai,4, • • • >at-U>
at-1,2, at_ij3, at-i,4, and calculate

e„ = fc+ !>*/? m°d?

l</<n, 1<^<4

5. Randomly choose 4n non-zero elements of Tq, &i,i, &i,2, &i,3,&M, • • •. &»,i,
^ A , 3 A , 4 , and another value A € Tq. Calculate
/* = e * + Aft* m o d *
and secretly send (e^-, W .

1 < i < n. 1 < ^

1 < j < 4, to £ , 1 < * < "•

6. Secretly send A and fhj, 1 < i < n, 1 < j < 4, to C.
• Co-Signing A Message:

agree to sign a non-zero message m €E Tq. Eacn pari P
partial signature as follows
k

=* ( -h

Pi= D- .U-/*

4

6J. (t, n) Threshold FSS Schemes
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Then he computes
°"i,i =

Vi,im + Vij2 mod q

°~i,2

—

i,i =

V i ) 3 m + Vi A mod q
I
{bi,\m + bi>2)pi mod q

«i,2 =

(bi,?,m + biA)pi mod q

K

and sends (pi,CT^I,oij2, ACJ,I, Kiy2, m) to the combiner C.
• Verifying A Partial Signature:
O n receiving a share from Si, C can verify the share by checking whether
/i,iftm + fopi = cr,-,i + A/c,-,! mod q
and
/i,3Pim + /i,4pi = <n,2 + A«i,2 m o d q
If the above equations do not hold the partial signature is rejected, otherwise
it is accepted.
• Signing a Message:
After C accepts the shares from S{, where 1 < i < t, she can construct the
signature by calculating

Sx =53<7i,l

m dq

°

t

s 2 = X) < 7 *. 2 moc??
i=l

and publishes (s 1; s 2 ) as a threshold signature on message m .

• Verifying A Signature:
T h e group's signature (su s2) can be verified by checking
+

s2a

Sld

= max + Oi2 over Ep(a, b)

6J. (t,n) Threshold FSS Schemes with the Assistance^
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• Proof of Forgery:
In case of dispute, when a forged signature (S'1)S'2) passes the verification
test, any t participants in Q can execute the above scheme to generate their
own signature on the same message, namely ( s ^ ) . , Since both (Sl,s2) and
(5'15 s'2) pass signature verification, the participants are able to solve E C D L by
calculating
s2-s'2
d — —
mod q
s[ - Sx
and use this value as a proof of forgery.

6.3.3 Security Proof
T h e o r e m 6.2 Collusion of (t — 1) polynomially bounded signers who have access to
previous communications

and signature cannot generate a forged signature.

Proof. T h e proof of security is provided by using a simulation argument for the view
of the enemy and showing that an enemy w h o has access to all the key information
of the (t - 1) .-corrupted group members and the signature on m could generate by
itself all the other public information produced by the protocol.
Without loss of generality, there are only the first t group members Si, S2, • * •, $t
that will be considered. A s s u m e that the enemy £ has corrupted <Si,«S2, • • • ,<St_i
and has learned their secrets. A simulator SIMU
to the simulator SIMU

is given to the scheme. The input

is the message m together with the signature on it, (sx, s2).

However, the secret information held by St is never exposed and is not simulated.
The simulator SIMU

works as follows.

1. K e y Generation
• Chooses Oi,i, aia, a^, aiA £R Fq and bi>u h,2, k^ h± e* T<*• Executes step (4) and (5) of <S's setup, and obtain A.
2. Message Co-Signing
• Generate ai>e for £ = 1,2 and i = 1, • • •, t - 1. C o m p u t e atjt = s£- £ £ 1 *,i

( m o d «)' f ° r l =

h %

It is easy to verify that the view of the adversary £ on execution of the protocol, and
its view on execution on SIMU
follows.

are statistically indistinguishable, and the result
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Theorem 6.3 The unbounded enemy cannot find the correct secret key that was
used by an honest member

St, so that he can forge a signature where later on, St

cannot provide a proof of forgery.
Proof. The information that is known by the unbounded eilemy is
fi,\Pim + fi,2pi = aitx + AKi;1
where
0£,i =

Vi,im + Vj,2

(mod q)

o"£,2 =

V i i 3 m -I- ViA (mod q)

There are 4 unknown variables, with two known equations. Therefore, there are q2
n

solutions for this equations which are equally likely.

6.4 (i, n) Threshold FSS Schemes without A Trus
Dealer
In this section, a (t, n) threshold FSS schemes without the assistance of a trusted
dealer will be constructed. The construction uses the FSS based on factorisation
and D L modulo composite number, given in section 3.3, and uses the idea of threshold signature schemes from [62]. A s in previous constructions, the underlying FSS
schemes can be replaced by any other FSS schemes.

Model
There is a group of N polynomially bounded senders, Q = Sx, S2, • • •, SN, a po ynomially bounded combiner C, w h o is only trusted in combining partial signatures, and
a trusted authority TA w h o is only active in pre-key generation. A group member
Si is assigned an element Xi e Tj.

The^mited enemy S can corrupt up to t - 1 g»»P -n*ers. » * assumed there
exists at least t honest participants.
• Prekey Generation:
Prekey generation is similar to the one given in
(p,,,.), publishes (n,f,aj)

and keeps ( M , . ) - r e f

«

^

3

T t a ^ «

^ t d at the stage and the rest of steps does not rehire the TA.

^

^
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• Prekey Verification:
Prekey verification is similar to section 3.3.
• Key Co-Generation:
I
Each signer Si chooses a secret key consisting of four randomly chosen elements
of Tj, that is: (an, aj2, bn, bi2) G J-f, and construct shares of his secret key for
other users. For this purpose he randomly selects four polynomials of degree
t-1 over Tj, denoted by e ^ x ) and fij(x), j = 1,2, such that e„(0) = a^ and
fij(0) = bi:i, for j = 1,2. The share for Sk (k = 1,2, • • •, n; k ^ i) is,
o-ikj = eij(xk) (mod /)
kkj = fijM

(mod/)

where j = 1,2.
Next, he constructs a public key to be used by Sk, as
Piki = aa*kl(3a'k2 (modn)
Pik2 = abiklf3bik2 (modn)

^ ^

ans his own public key,
p a = aail/3ai2 (modn)
pi2 ' = abilpbi2 (modn)

(6 2 )

The public keys in equation 6.1 and 6.2 are placed in a secure public directory,
and the shares of his secret key are sent to the other Sk via a secure channel.
The group public key is
7l

= f[Pn (modn)
t=i

=

72

a&i 0 ' 1 /?£"=i 0i2

(modn)

= f[Pl2 (modn)
i=l

=

QE^^^I

6

-

2

(modn)
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Message Co-Signing:

Without loss of generality, assume that signer Sr,---,St want to sign a me
m e T j . Each Si generates his partial signature as,

Vit = ait + Yl aju x II ~Xk ) +
\\
e + £ bja

x

k=\,k^iXi XkJ

j=t+l

II ~^- J x ml (mod /)
j=t+l
k=l,kfrXi Xk J

)

for t=l,2. Then, Si sends yix and yi2 to the combiner C.
• Partial Signature Verification:
C can verify the correctness of S^s partial signature by checking if
f

n

\ llfe = l,fc,4i

i

Pn - n ^i

v

/ /
\ n*
~Xkm \?
I n
\LLk=l,kfrx -x
^ \ n pi*
V ^=t+1 '
J

Xi-xk

X

d=t+i

avnpyu

k

(mod n)

holds. If the equation does not hold, then the partial signature is rejecte
» Threshold Signature Generation:
After receiving the shares from S{, where i = 1, • • • ,t, C can construct the FSS
signature by calculating
t

ye = Y,y*t (mod-f)
i=i

for £ = 1 , 2 . This gives the signature on message m e Ff as (yx,y2) € Ts.
• Signature Verification:
The signature (yuy2) on message m can be verified by testing whether
7l7™

=

f3y2m

yi
a

(mod n)

• Proof of Forgery:
CnfH<t signers want to show that a message, signature
^&
Suppose a subgroup Qolt<t signers w
pair, (m,y) is forged. They need tofindt - t honest sign
second signature on m. This can be done as follows.
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1. T h e group submit their partial signatures to the combiner and request
proof of forgery algorithm to be run.
2. T h e combiner collects (m, y) and the t' partial signatures and sends a
request for partial signature on m to signers Pil/? ..Pik, rejects the invalid
signatures and continues until t - t' valid signatures are received. This
step will finish because it is assumed there does exist a group of t honest
signers.
3. T h e combiner constructs a signature y' or m which can be used by Q as
a proof of forgery.

6.4.1 Security Analysis
It is necessary to consider two types of attacks, namely the attack from,
1. a colluding group of size at most t - 1 polynomially bounded signers;
2. an enemy with unlimited computational power (Security for the signers);

In both cases the aim of the attacker(s) is to forge a signature that is acceptabl
the receiver and cannot be proved to be a forgery.
Theorem 6.4 Collusion of (t -1) polynomially signers who have access to previous
communications and signature cannot generate a forged signature.

Proof. The proof of security is provided by using a simulation argument for the vi
of the enemy and showing that an enemy w h o has access to all the key information
of the (t - 1) corrupted group members and the signature on m could generate by
itself all the other public information produced by the protocol.
Without loss of generality, onlythefirst**£->*-

^

considered. A s s u m e that the enemy £ has corrupted S,A,
their secrets. A simulator SIMU
the simulator SIMU

h

—

,*-t

is constructed for the scheme. T h

is the message m together with the stature on

m

^ to

U ^ ) .

However, the secret information held by 5, is never exposed and - not s.mulated.
T h e simulator SIMU

works as follows.

1. Key Generation
1

•/• —

. Chooses (0*1, ai2, hi, &a) € * ) , for » = V ''

1

6.4. (t, n) Threshold FSS Schemes without A Trusted Deaier
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• Executes the key co-generation step as in the original scheme. At the end
of the key co-generation phase of the simulation, each Si (i = 1, • • •, t -1)
holds the following values.
(a) aix,ai2,bix,bi2 e J / ;

^

(b) Pa,Pl2eZ*n,
(c) Pikx,Pik2eZ*n,hrk

=

l,2,---n;k^i

2. Message Co-Signing and Verification
• C o m p u t e partial signature using the original scheme, namely yn,
for i = 1, ••-,*-! and £ = 1,2.
• Compute
t-\

yki = yt-Yv^ (mod/)
;=i

for^=l,2.
It is straightforward to verify that the view of the enemy £ on execution of the
protocol, and'its view on execution of SIMU

are statistically indistinguishable,-and

so the result follows.
To analyse sender's security it is necessary to consider collusion of the two typas
of enemy. That is, assume that the unbounded enemy has access to the secret key
of t - 1 signers wants to forge the partial signature of another signer not in the
colluding group.
T h e o r e m 6.5 The success chance of an unbounded enemy, who is assisted by (t-1)
polynomially bounded signers, to forge a signature that cannot be shown to be a
forgery by a group of t honest signers is 2" .
Proof. It is assumed that a valid pair of message, signature and all the corresponding
partial signatures are k n o w n and the colluding enemies want to obtam the secret ot
,
+v,of <? • • • S+ have generated a
another signer. Without loosing generality, assume that Sx, , *
,rJ • < w <? • • • St 1 are colluding members.
correct signature (Vl, y 2 ) for m € Th and in fact, bx,
, oi-i
Hence, they can construct:
yu
t=i

6.4. (t,n) Threshold FSS Schemes without A Trusted Dealer
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for £ = 1,2, where
Vtt

au + E *j*x IT — z z +
k=l,k?i x «

j=t+l

bte + E hi x II
j=t+l

k=l,kfr

r

Xl

x

k

_ TX

xm

(mod /)

k

Since the colluders know
a

ci = E

-Xk

atx n _ _ _ (mod /)
Jfe=l,k#x*

j=t+l

Xfc

and
-£fc

c2 = j=t+l
E bju xfc=l,fe#
n x^

(mod /)

xk

the equation can be rewritten as (for £ = 1,2)
yu -cx-c2
or
Wl
W2

= ati + btim (mod /)

= aa + &nm (mod /)
= bti + bam~ {mod f)

(6.3)

With the additional knowledge of the unbounded enemy who is able tosolve the
underlying hard problem, from the public key of St, they can construct
W3
m

=
=

+ aat2 (mod /) (from Ptl)
btl + abt2 (mod /) (from Pa)

an

(6.4)

following
where a is obtained from loga(£). Combining equation 6.3 and 6.4, the
equation is obtained:
Wl

= atx + him

(mod/)

W2

= at2 + bt2m

(mod/)

W3

=

atx+aat2

(mod/)

wA = hx + abt2 (mod/)
This equation can be rewritten as
/ Wl \
w2
\w4 /

0\ ((a.
an \
an
0 1 0 m
Wx
1 a 0 0

f 1 0 m

^00

1

aJ

(mod /)
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It is easy to see that this matrix has rank = 3 (this is true because r^mr^-rx-ari =
0, where r{ is the ith row of the matrix, and noting that the submatrix consisting
of thefirst3 columns has 3 independent rows), and therefore, there are / different
solutions which are equally likely to this equation.

•

Theorem 6.6 The proposed Threshold FSS scheme is secure for the receiver un
DL assumption.

Proof. A proof by contradiction is provided. Assume that there is an algori
which on input (skx, • • •, skt) (where ski denotes the secret key of Si) and a message
m can produce two different signatures on m, namely (3/1,1/2) and (3/1,3/2)- Then, an
algorithm D can be constructed that on input (n, /, a, /3), where j3 = aa

(mod /)

and ordn(a) = /, outputs a as follows:
Firstly, A is run with an arbitrary m G Zf, and the two signatures on it will be
produced. Then, D computes:
ayipy2

—

y l
a

' (3y'2 (mod n)
(yi-yi) =
a =

a(y'2-y2) (mod/)
(i/i-viXi/i-ifc)"1

(mod/)

D is successful with the same probability as A and almost equally efficient. Hence,
•
it contradicts the D L assumption.

6.5 Summary
In this Chapter, distributed FSS schemes have been constructed and their security
has been analysed. As noted in this Chapter, the proof of forgery requnes ., c laboration of a group of members and the assumption is there are a least horns
members in the system. That is each signer must
^
^
^
the correct signature of the signers on the message must be constructed
that at leastt honest signers must participate

^

^

them does not submit his correct part.al s , g n * u « «

J

An open question is to design systems .n « £ £

_

£

of the users do not take part in the proof of forgery.
honest signer can provide proof of forgery.

£

^

^ ^

^

^

%

^

Chapter 7
Conclusion and Further Work
A fail-stop signature (FSS) scheme is designed to protect information theoretic;
: security for a signer against an unbounded forger. This means that although the enemy
is unbounded, the signer can still deny the forged signature by providing a valid
proof of forgery. In the proof of forgery, the signer uses his own secret key, which
matches with the published public key. T h e unbounded enemy can derive all the
secret keys which match the public key, but cannot determine which secret key has
been used by the signer. Hence, by showing two different signatures on the same
message, the -signer can prove that the underlying hard problem of the system has
been broken, and the system must be stopped - hence the name fail-stop. A n FSS
consists of a polynomial time protocol for key generation and two polynomial time
algorithms for sign and test. However, unlike an ordinary signature scheme, an FSS
is also equipped with two additional polynomial time algorithms, namely proof of
forgery and proof test.
There is a general construction of F S S which can be used to provide a secnnty
proof of a secure F S S [98]. In Chapter 2, the general construction of F S S schemes
due to Pfitzmann and Pedersen [98] was briefly recalled. A lower bound for he
size of the secret key, the public hey and the signature has also been grven m [ I
Efficiency of an F S S can be defined in terms of the secret hey the pub c e an
the signature lengths. However, it is useful to consider the tela ve taj hs of
message and the signature (it is also known as the —
tneasure wasfirstlyproposed in W

,

and also discussed m

4

*

-

«

C h a ^ £ « £ •

general construction of FSS in ^^^^ „ „ logarithm
review of the two known constructions of FSb wmcn
and factorisation problem.
In Chapter 3, a variant of the v H P scheme w
106

^

^
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proposed. Next, a scheme that is based on the well-known R S A assumption was
described. 'However, this scheme does not follow the general construction of [98],
and therefore, cannot be proved to be secure. A n improvement of this scheme

was
given in the following section using a modified factorisation assumption, togeth er
with the discrete logarithm modulo a composite numbed The resulting scheme
performs equally to the most efficient F S S scheme. Finally, a scheme which is based
on factorisation and discrete logarithm was presented. This scheme outperforms the
v H P scheme with respect to the message length. This scheme also performs almost
the same as the v H P scheme, with respect to the FSS parameters.
In Chapter 4, a n e w general construction of FSS scheme based on authentication
codes was proposed. This general construction provides a provably secure method of
constructing FSS. Following the general construction, an example from the previous
Chapter was taken, and it was proven that the construction can be regarded as
an example of this general construction. In the sequel, a new FSS scheme which is
based on linear authentication codes was proposed. In fact, this scheme is a specially
designed F S S scheme for signing long messages.
Chapter 5* gave a comparison of different FSS schemes. The comparison is made
with respect to the F S S parameters, the redundancy rate and the performance of
the F S S schemes to be used for signing long messages.
J n Chapter 6, a distributed version of F S S was discussed. The main goal of this
Chapter is to replace a single entity in the traditional FSS schemes by a group of
users, in which their collaboration is required during the signature generation and
proof of forgery phase.

,7.1 Fulfilment of Aims and Objectives
The aims and objectives of this thesis were briefly outlined in the first Chapter.
This thesis has been carried out with the following goal:
"Contributions to Fail-Stop Signature Schemes"
T h e goal w a s achieved by studying known constructions, designing new FSS
schemes, and providing a new general construction of FSS schemes from authentn
cation codes. T h e major contributions of this thesis can be summarised as follows.
. New definition of efficiency with respect to the message length / redundancy
rate (Chapter 2).

7.2. Further Work and Open

Problems

1U8

• N e w construction of F S S schemes based on factorisation and discrete logarithm modulo composite number which performs equally to the v H P scheme
(Chapter 3).
• New construction of FSS schemes based on factorisation and discrete logarithm which outperforms the v H P scheme with respect to the message length
(Chapter 3).
• General construction for FSS schemes from Authentication Codes (Chapter
4)• N e w construction of F S S schemes based on Linear Authentication Codes which
outperforms the v H P schemes for signing long messages (Chapter 4).
• Design of distributed FSS schemes (Chapter 6).

7.2 Further Work and Open Problems
ims proble
During the development of this thesis, a variety of interesting issues and
encounarose which were mostly challenging and occasionally frustrating. Some encoi
tered problems were dispatched in hours and days, but there have been some which
required further study and took even months to be completely resolved.
In this section, some open questions and possible directions for further work are
presented. T h e question remains whether there exists an optimal construction of
FSS schemes that meet the lower bound that was derived in [98].
The general construction for F S S from Authentication Codes, described in Chapter 4, is an interesting proposal. Whether this general construction and the general
construction of [98] are equivalent is still an open problem. This work canfc,ex
tended to provide more suitable classes of authentication codes that can be used
constructing a better F S S schemes.
Another open question, which comes from Chapter 6, is the follow,*
// there J only a s,ngle Honest user in the system, „ » can m e proof of forgery
be provided ?
T h e proposed solutions for dtstnbuted FSS schem
are honest users w h o are willing to ^
^
J
,
However, if there is only a single m e m b e r of the group

assumption that there
^
honest , a n d

there is

7.2. turther Work and Open
-—

Problems
.

j.uy

a forged signature, h o w the proof of forgery can be provided is still an interesting
open research question.

/
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